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ABSTRACT
Engineering, management, and social science methodologies have been employed to
analyze a new asset tracking and management system for human spaceflight applications. The
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Aurora Flight Sciences developed Rule-based
analytic Asset Management for Space Exploration System (RAMSES) via NASA Small-
Business Technology Transfer (STTR) Phase I and Phase II contracts. RAMSES leverages
Generation II passive Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology to automate the
tracking the tens of thousands of small, portable cargo assets that are currently stored onboard
the International Space Station (ISS).
A Monte Carlo Net Present Value analysis found that RAMSES is likely to have
significant positive value for NASA when ISS inventory transactions are concentrated in a subset
of the total cargo transfer bag (CTB) population, and/or if ISS Operations are continued into
2018/2020. The volume, mass, and accuracy of the RAMSES system have a significant impact
upon the estimated NPV. Testing of the prototype hardware in reduced-gravity conditions
reaffirmed the viability of the system. Metals cargo objects were detected with up to 100%
accuracy, paper with 96%, and water with roughly 93%.
Finally, a comparative analysis of RAMSES and five other NASA Small-Business
Innovation Research (SBIR) / Small-Business Technology Transfer (STTR) projects identified
three non-technical characteristics and/or informal processes that might be unique to SBIR/STTR
technologies that are successfully infused into the mainstream NASA innovation system. These
included pre-proposal knowledge exchanges between companies and NASA, strong matching of
a project with a relevant NASA COTR, and the availability of an infusion opportunity.
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NOMENCLATURE
a percentage of inventory transactions that can be automated by RFID system
# = system effectiveness parameter
B benefits, U.S. dollars ($)
C costs (or capital), U.S. dollars ($)
g acceleration due to gravity at Earth's surface, 9.81 meters/second 2
N = number of years
r = discount rate, %
n = number of iterations
NPVo initial Net Present Value based on "best-information" values ($)
NPV, = revised Net Present Value based on iteration of variable X undergoing sensitivity
analysis ($)
s seconds
p percentage of automate-able inventory transactions that are detected by RFID
system
X = initial value of variable undergoing sensitivity analysis
X = revised value of variable undergoing sensitivity analysis
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
PREAMBLE
We can no longer go it alone. It does not matter if the challenge is space exploration, climate
change, health care, education, transportation, agriculture, poverty alleviation, or one of the
multitude of other issues in our world today that one might choose to tackle. We are coming to
understand that no single person - and more importantly, no single discipline - can
independently solve such challenges. We live in an extremely complex, heterogeneous world in
which the pace of change and the degree of interconnectivity are accelerating by the nanosecond.
Our systems and challenges are no longer purely social or purely technical (if indeed they ever
were); all contain significant elements of both. Therefore, teams and approaches which bring
together the social, engineering, and management sciences have the potential to make unique and
significant contributions to some of the greatest challenges which our world faces today.
This limited master's thesis does not claim to address any challenge of such global importance.
However, it does attempt to apply this holistic, multi-disciplinary perspective and methodology
to a meaningful problem in the complex realm of human spaceflight. Hardware testing,
probabilistic financial modeling, and policy analysis are all brought to bear on this challenge. In
the end, the results demonstrate that the problem can indeed be solved, but only with an approach
that is both technical and non-technical in nature.
BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
The challenges of human spaceflight are
daunting. Among the greatest of these
challenges are the logistical demands of
a long-duration mission such as the
International Space Station (ISS) or a
crewed lunar outpost. Tens of thousands
of small, portable items are currently
stored onboard the International Space
Station (ISS). These items include
consumables and provisions of all sorts,
from food and office supplies to clothing
and spare parts. Maintaining an accurate
record of the quantities and locations of
these assets is a significant task,
scheduled to consume some 4.5 person-
months of astronaut time every year once
Complete" [1].
Figure 1.1. Thousands of items are stored in Cargo
Transfer Bags (CTBs), which line the walls of ISS.
(image credit: NASA)
the ISS reaches its final state, known as "Assembly
A significant portion of this 4.5 person months is due to the nature of the current ISS Inventory
Management System (IMS), which is barcode-based. Cargo items aboard ISS are tagged with
individual barcodes, as are cargo locations (cargo transfer bags (CTBs), racks, lockers, etc). To
track a cargo asset, NASA requires that every time that an item is consumed and/or moved, an
astronaut use a handheld barcode scanner and record the barcode of the item, the barcode of the
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item's origin container, and the barcode of the item's destination container. As an alternative,
astronauts can verbally report asset usage and/or moves to Mission Control's Inventory Stowage
Officers (ISOs), who in turn enter the changes into the Inventory Management System (IMS) by
hand [1].
The accuracy of the current system is quite reasonable; in January of 2008, only 3% of the
13,000 US items on-orbit were designated by NASA as "lost," which one Mission Controller
defined as "stuff that we [NASA] really have no idea where it is." However, in an environment
as demanding as that of human spaceflight, the loss of even a few items can be quite serious. For
example, in early 2006, astronauts were unable to conduct spacewalks for two weeks while they
searched for four misplaced lithium-hydroxide canisters that remove CO 2 from the Russian
spacesuits [2]. Relatively large items have also been lost at times; in 2005, a Pump Package
Assembly - measuring 20" x 20" x 36", roughly the size of a mini-fridge - went missing [3].
The ISS crew conducted multiple searches on-orbit while looking for this item, while an
"obscene" amount of engineer-time was spent on the ground spent poring through IMS and
brainstorming possibilities in meetings. In the end, the assembly was found in a cavity behind a
panel aboard ISS; apparently a former crew had designated that space to be a convenient storage
location, but had neglected to update IMS or inform Houston about it [1]. NASA currently has
little recourse when the crew does not enter updated asset location and/or consumption data into
IMS; in another such instance, a lack of inventory updates in 2004 led to an unexpected
depletion of food stocks, forcing the crew to cut back on their meals until the next resupply
vehicle arrived [4].
Rule-based analytic Asset Management for Space Exploration Systems (RAMSES)
To better address the challenges of cargo asset management in human spaceflight applications,
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Aurora Flight Sciences have developed
Rule-based analytic Asset Management for Space Exploration Systems (RAMSES) over the past
three years, via Phase I and Phase II Small-Business Technology Transfer (STTR) contracts with
NASA. RAMSES is an automated and wireless system utilizing a modular, layered architecture.
It enables automated multi-level asset tracking and management based on state-of-the-art Radio
Frequency Identification (RFID) technology. The main advantages of this RAMSES over current
bar-code based asset tracking include: (i) significant time savings through automation, (ii) real-
time remote status monitoring (via internet, if desired), and (iii) rule-based analytics for
proactive asset management. RAMSES has the potential to save a significant portion of the 4.5
person-months per year of on-orbit astronaut time that is budgeted for inventory management
aboard ISS (for a six-person crew).
This joint MIT/Aurora effort builds upon previous work regarding asset tracking and supply
chain management for human space exploration. Evans et al. (2006) examined NASA's
collection of logistics-related "Lessons Learned" from the Space Shuttle, Shuttle-MIR, and
International Space Station programs in order to identify potential issues for NASA's new
Constellation program. One of the key challenges identified was the large human-in-the-loop
component of NASA's previous and existing logistics systems [5]. Galluzzi et al. (2006) studied
and advocated that NASA adopt modern, commercial Supply Chain Management best-practices
[6]. Finally, de Weck and Simchi-Levi (2006) and Gralla et al. (2005) described an MIT team's
extensive field campaign to study human space exploration logistics at the Haughton Mars Base
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on Devon Island in 2005 [7; 8]. This expedition examined the use of an integrated,
comprehensive inventory database and a unified asset classification system to track inventory
[9]. Importantly, it also demonstrated that an RFID-based inventory management system
(specifically, a first, proof-of-concept version of the RAMSES system) could save significant
time compared to a manual barcode tracking system such as that currently used on the
International Space Station [10].
Since this demonstration, the RAMSES hardware has continued
to evolve. First, the crude demonstration model from the
Haughton Mars Base was transformed into a second-generation
hard-container with superior systems integration and
performance. Then, most recently, the system was integrated
into a double-sized NASA Cargo Transfer Bag (CTB) to
produce a "smart CTB" (Figure 1.2). There are some 500
CTBs currently on-orbit, and they store most of the small,
portable cargo assets on ISS. Integrating the RFID-based
RAMSES system into ISS CTBs would offer two key
advantages over the current ISS barcode system. For one, it
would render certain ISS inventory updates "hands-free",
requiring no action on the part of either the flight crew or
1.2. Double-sized ISS CTB ground engineers. Every time a bag is opened and closed, the
retrofit with RAMSES System system would automatically initialize and query the passive
RFID tags attached to all of the items inside. Any changes in the bag's contents would be
instantly transmitted via Station's 802.1 lb Wi-Fi network to the IMS, as illustrated in Figure 1.3.
No longer would astronauts need to take the time to manually scan barcodes every time they
consumed or moved an item, nor
would flight controllers need to
enter it for them on the ground.
The other advantage is that NASA
would possess greater confidence
that the information in IMS - such
as the status of food stocks - is
entirely up-to-date at every
moment, a potentially important
safety and mission assurance
improvement.
At its core, RAMSES is an
information architecture. As S
illustrated in Figure 1.4, new Figure 1.3. Illustration of RAMSES Operational Scenario
information about tracked cargo (Credit: Aurora Flight Sciences)
items flows into the system via one
or more physical "sensors" (such as the "smart CTB"). These sensors can be of any hardware
type, and different types and/or combinations of sensors can be used to track cargo items across
multiple hierarchical layers of specificity (container-level, room-level, city block-level, etc).
_ 14 J
Physical Architecture Informational Architecture in ations imdately
filtered through RAMSES'
evesRule-Based Analytic
algorithms. These user-
acreated algorithms sift
ratthrough the new and
existing data, identifying
any inventory changes (i.e.,
the food supply has run
flow) or relationships (a
high-pressure canister was
exteal .... just placed next to a very
sharp object) that are ofinterest to the user, and
Figure 1.4. RAMSES System Architecture Block Diagram updating the status of all
(Image Credit: Aurora Flight Sciences / 0. de Weck) items in the Relational
Database. When an
algorithm finds a match, this "event" causes a notification to be sent to the user(s) via the
Messaging System. This notification could be an email, a text message, a special note in the data
log, etc. The system currently includes a software interface known as RAILS that can be
accessed from any common web-browser. From RAILS, a user can view and search the contents
of the Relational Database, can create/edit/delete Rule-Based Analytics, and set the Messaging
System. With the proper set of sensors and location, RAILS can also overlay cargo item
information on Google Maps.
Figure 1.5. "Smart" CTB System Diagram
(Image Credit: Aurora Flight Sciences)
Figure 1.5 illustrates the technical details of the RAMSES Smart CTB prototype. As described
above, the idea behind this prototype is to retrofit an existing NASA Cargo Transfer Bag to
convert it into a sensor that is connected to the RAMSES information architecture - and
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eventually, to NASA's own Inventory Management System. The Smart CTB prototype includes
multiple Generation II RFID antennas, a compatible RFID reader contained within the
Electronics Box, a rechargeable 5V Lithium-Ion battery, a Wi-Fi broadcaster, and a magnetic lid
switch that can "wake-up" the system and trigger a scan of the bag's contents whenever the lid is
opened and then re-closed. Finally, a fine mesh of copper wire is used to electromagnetically
isolate the interior of the bag from its external surroundings, thus preventing the CTB's internal
antennas from detecting RFID tags that are outside the bag (and similarly preventing any nearby
external antennas from detecting the RFID tags that are within the bag). A complete parts list is
included in Appendix F.
Thesis Questions
The first part of this thesis, consisting of Chapters 2-4, examines the value proposition of the
RAMSES system and validates initial performance estimates. It tackles two key questions.
First, given NASA's current inventory management system and processes, is this RFID system
likely to deliver sufficient value to justify the investment necessary to develop, test, and
implement it, even with several uncertain parameters? Second, how does the system prototype
perform, in both normal (Ig) and micro-gravity environments? Can it reliably detect cargo items
of various material types, particularly in reduced gravity conditions such as it would encounter
on ISS?
To answer the first question - would this system likely deliver positive Net Present Value (NPV)
- NASA's existing ISS asset tracking systems and processes were mapped, from initial
manifesting through arrival on ISS through end-of-life disposal, as described in Chapter 2. Then,
based on this information, a financial model of NASA's existing ISS inventory management
architecture was constructed, and Monte Carlo NPV simulations were run to examine the
probabilistic net worth of various implementations of the RFID-based inventory system. This
work is described in Chapter 3. For the second question - can the RAMSES system reliably
detect cargo items of various materials - an extensive series of hardware experiments were
conducted in the lab to characterize the real-world performance of the prototype system against
several key variables (such as cargo item material composition). Additional experiments were
conducted on NASA's reduced-gravity aircraft in order to characterize hardware performance in
a simulated space microgravity environment. The results and analysis of these tests are
contained in Chapter 4.
However, even if this proposed technological system were demonstrated to be 100% accurate, as
well as likely to deliver value in excess of the required initial investment (the questions
addressed in Chapters 3 and 4), there remains at least one other critical challenge. How does
such a new technology - particularly one developed outside NASA via the Small Business
Innovation Research (SBIR) / Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program, such as
RAMSES - actually get taken up by NASA and "infused" into the agency's own innovation
system, and eventually into an operational program such as the International Space Station? The
second part of this thesis, Chapter 5, examines this issue.
Continued technological innovation, along many dimensions, is a key enabler for the success of
any ambitious spaceflight project, whether it be human or robotic. Multiple technology
infusion/development programs exist within NASA, including a few expressly designed to
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leverage the innovative capacity of entrant firms such as Aurora Flight Sciences of the RAMSES
project [11]. Unfortunately, although these programs have been relatively successful in
accelerating the development of new "component" technologies, their record of infusion into the
overall NASA innovation system is more ambiguous. The Small Business Innovative Research
(SBIR) / Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program is one such effort, and has some
unique characteristics as a mandatory program that Congress imposed on all major Federal
Research & Development Agencies in the early 1980's.
Congress articulated four goals for the program, which was first authorized in 1982 by the Small
Business Innovation Development Act. These goals are:
1. To stimulate technological innovation.
2. To increase private-sector commercialization of innovations.
3. To use small business to meet federal research and development needs.
4. To foster and encourage participation by minority and disadvantaged persons in
technological innovation [12].
Federal law mandates that eleven federal agencies each set aside 2.5% of their extramural
research and development program to fund SBIR awards, with an additional 0.3% allocated for
STTR awards. Five of these agencies - DOD, Health & Human Services (esp. NIH), NSF,
NASA, and DOE - account for 96% of SBIR program awards. NASA's program is the fourth
largest, overall, with $103 million in funding distributed in 2005. The SBIR and STTR programs
each consist of two phases; the first is meant to be a feasibility assessment of the idea's scientific
and technical merit, while the second is a larger-scale research and development push towards
realizing an idea's scientific, technical, and commercial promise. At NASA, the typical Phase I
award is roughly $60,000 for six months (with a maximum of $100,000), while a typical Phase II
award is for a maximum of $600,000 for 2 years [12; 13]. The STTR program is very similar,
with the caveats that it must involve a University partner as well as a small business, and its
Phase I awards are for 12 months instead of 6 [13].
While Congress has several motivations for the SBIR and STTR programs, it is clearly in the
sponsoring agency's interest to maximize the utility it derives from such a mandatory
investment. This is particularly true for NASA, which has seen its research and development
budgets squeezed significantly in recent years due, in part, to cost-overruns in major programs
such as Constellation, the Mars Science Laboratory, and the James Webb Space Telescope.
Therefore, when the NRC reports that only 15.9% of NASA SBIR Phase II projects' were known
to have received some kind of follow-on funding (be it as direct procurement or as further
development funding) from NASA [12], one is tempted to ask - can this return on investment be
improved? Certainly, a 100% infusion rate should not be the goal, nor even a 50% rate, for such
figures would likely indicate that the program was not investing in those inherently risky ideas
that might result in radical innovation. However, it seems worthwhile to investigate whether
improvements can be made to increase the infusion rate of successful projects while maintaining
the risk-tolerance of the program.
15.9% of 82 that responded to an NRC survey
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The SBIR/STTR program has received previous attention in the literature, including [12; 14; 15;
16; 17; 18] among others. The National Research Council convened a symposium on the topic
of SBIR/STTR infusion in 2005 [15]; however, this work included participation from all five of
the largest federal agencies that sponsor SBIR/STTR, and thus NASA's program (as only the
fourth-largest out of five) did not receive significant attention. The differences between the
agencies are important; for example, the infusion opportunities at an $18 billion agency such as
NASA are more limited than in a $600+ billion agency such as DOD. More recently, Keifer [17]
and Anderson & lacomini [18] shared some general suggestions from their companies'
experience in the program, particularly with respect to NASA. However, while interesting
anecdotes, both papers focused on successful commercialization of the technology and the need
for an appropriate business plan, rather than infusion of the technology into NASA's innovation
system. Further, there was no significant discussion of the informal processes which help enable
infusion at NASA. Thus, a gap exists in the literature. Preliminary evidence, from the RAMSES
project and as well as other companies' NASA SBIR/STTR efforts, indicates that technical
success is not enough to guarantee successful infusion. Certain non-technical characteristics and
informal processes also seem to have an influence on the outcome.
In Chapter 5, this thesis explores the impact of such non-technical characteristics and informal
processes on the infusion of NASA SBIR/STTR projects such as RAMSES into NASA's
mainstream innovation. Did those projects which have been successfully infused possess any
common non-technical characteristics, and/or utilize any of the same informal processes? If so,
what were those characteristics and/or processes? Were such characteristics and processes
absent from those projects which were not successfully infused? These questions are examined
via six case studies involving several New England small businesses that are active in the SBIR
program, as well as via interviews with NASA officials at all levels of the agency who are
involved in technology development. A comparative analysis framework was constructed to
elicit similarities and differences across the cases - including the RAMSES project - and draw
out those common factors which prove significant.
ROADMAP
Before concluding this introduction, it seems appropriate to provide a brief summary of the
structure of the remainder of this document.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of NASA's current asset tracking, management, and
transportation procedures for all cargo items bound for the International Space Station. This
overview describes the processes and procedures from initial manifesting at the Johnson or
Kennedy Space Centers, through packing, launch, arrival at ISS, on-orbit storage, and finally
waste disposal.
Chapter 3 uses the information from Chapter 2 and other sources to evaluate the likely net
present value of the RAMSES RFID system if it were applied to the International Space Station.
Monte Carlo techniques are utilized to estimate this value given several uncertain parameters. A
sensitivity analysis is conducted to identify the most significant of the uncertain design
parameters.
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Chapter 4 contains the results and analysis of the extensive testing that was conducted to
characterize the performance of the Cargo Transfer Bag prototype of the RAMSES hardware.
These tests simulated a wide variety of operating conditions, including a set of trials conducted
in reduced gravity conditions.
Chapter 5 conducts a comparative analysis of the RAMSES project and five other NASA
SBIR/STTR projects to identify any informal processes and nontechnical characteristics that
might be common to successfully-infused SBIR/STTR technologies.
Finally, Chapter 6 combines the results of the three core analyses of this work - the financial,
technical, and policy - and draws conclusions regarding the prospects for the RAMSES system
to successfully address the ISS logistics challenge, and for it and other SBIR/STTR technologies
to be transitioned into the mainstream NASA innovation system and eventually into operational
missions.
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CHAPTER 2: OVERVIEW OF NASA's INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION SUPPLY CHAIN
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an overview of NASA's current asset tracking, management, and
transportation procedures for all cargo items bound for the International Space Station (ISS).
This overview describes the processes and procedures from initial manifesting at the Johnson or
Kennedy Space Centers, through packing, launch, arrival at ISS, on-orbit storage, and finally
waste disposal. The information was gathered via interviews with more than 20 NASA
personnel during site visits to the Kennedy and Johnson Space Centers in January of 2008.
INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION INVENTORY ARCHITECTURE
Overview
The inventory management system for the International Space Station is chiefly based upon
barcodes, soft cargo bags and kits (including hard metal kits for food), and a database called the
Inventory Management System (IMS). All cargo items2 are labeled with a barcode which is
entered into IMS; thereafter, to update the location and/or status of an item, one can scan the
barcode and then enter the appropriate changes into the database. NASA employs a number of
engineers at JSC to support the on-orbit crew with inventory management tasks; these engineers
are known as Inventory Stowage Officers (ISOs). Four separate copies of the Inventory
Management System (IMS) are currently in simultaneous operation, in Houston, Moscow,
Baikanour, and onboard ISS. These databases are too large to synchronize by transferring them
in their entirety, so every inventory change is tracked in what are called Delta Files. These Delta
Files are exchanged once or more per day between all four locations to synchronize the four
databases.
Packing Information Flow
As shown in Figure 2.1, there are at least three databases involved in different stages of the ISS
cargo manifesting and packing process 3. The manifest for each flight - the complete list of all
hardware that will be flown - is first entered into a database known as MIDAS. Next, the
"containment" material - Ziploc bags, packing foam, etc - that will be used to pack and
safeguard the hardware is entered into the same database. Following this, the information is
uploaded to MAXIMO 4, the database used by the Lockheed Martin Cargo Mission Contract
(CMC) organization to generate work-orders and track serial numbers and barcodes. POWER is
the name of the front-end interface for MAXIMO, specifically modified for packing operations.
2 A single "item" is typically defined by packaging; for example, a single spare part that is packaged individually
would be considered one item, while a Ziploc bag containing ten screws would also be considered one item. The
spare part would have one barcode, while the Ziploc bag would also have one barcode. A package of five shirts
would also have a single barcode. However, an item with separable pieces (such as a telephone - base and handset)
might have a barcode on each piece.
3 Figure 1 is simplified, only showing the flow when items are packed and reviewed at KSC, which is the most
common path.
4 Perhaps significantly for RFID applications, MAXIMO and IMS currently can accept input from a handheld
barcode scanner.
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When the packing of CTBs and other bags is complete, the packing is
Review held at either KSC or JSC, depending on the packing organization.
inspected at a Bench
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Figure 2.1: ISS United States Packing Information Flow
After the Bench Review and the generation of the As-Built Pack List (ABPL), also called the
Engineering Configuration List (ECL), the inventory data is entered into the Inventory
Management System (IMS) by the Integration Stowage Officers (ISOs). During this transfer, the
ISOs modify the inventory list according to crew preferences and historical practices; in
particular, they remove information about item packaging (i.e., Ziploc bags are not listed).
Bags and Kits
There exist several different types of cargo bags, kits, and containers that are used for the ISS
Program. These include CTBs, M-bags, mid-deck locker equivalent (MLE) bags, medical kits,
5and food containers . CTBs serve as a kind of soft, flexible Nomex "suitcase" or duffel bag as
shown in Figure 2.2; they were the primary focus of this trip and will be discussed in greater
detail in the subsequent section. CTBs come in four sizes: the Half CTB, Single CTB, Double
CTB, and Triple CTB. The standard-sized Single CTB measures 19.75" x 16.75" x 9.75",6, and
is used as a unit of measure called a Cargo Transfer Bag Equivalent (CTBE) to describe the
capacity (and shape) of some of the other bags.
s Note that this is not meant to be a comprehensive list, but rather a list of the most commonly-used.6 Ref: Hart, Angela. Internal Cargo Integration Overview. Powerpoint Presentation. NASA. Date unknown.
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Figure 2.2: Empty Half CTBs (credit: A. Grindle) and Single CTB Engineering Drawing
(credit: NASA)
M-bags are soft-bags, larger than CTBs (see Figure 2.3) and available in three variants: M01 (6
CTBEs), M02 (4 CTBEs), and M03 (10 CTBEs). They can be used to help contain CTBs during
launch/return or to pack oversize items. Medical kits, similar to CTBs, are made from Nomex
and feature removable/adjustable plastic inserts. They are the same size as a Double CTB. MLE
bags are specially designed bags that fit into the Orbiter's mid-deck lockers; unlike CTBs, they
are not transferred to ISS but instead remain with the Shuttle. Finally, the containers used to
transport and store food for ISS are smaller than CTBs and constructed of metal, as shown in
Figure 2.4.
CARGO TRANSFER BAGS
NASA's Cargo Transfer Bags were developed for ISS
based upon lessons learned from three previous-generation
cargo bags used in the Shuttle-MIR program. As
mentioned before, the bags are made from a flame-
retardant fabric material known as Nomex, and come in
four different sizes. A table with bag dimensions and
capacity can be found in Appendix A, along with
engineering drawings of each of the four configurations.
The most-used bag size is the Half CTB, by a ratio of
roughly 2:1 over the Single CTB.
Figure 2.3: M02 Bag (4 CTBE) It is estimated that there are approximately 500 CTBs
Credit: NASA currently onboard ISS. Many of these have remained
unopened for years. At Assembly Complete, it is expected
that there will be at least 600 CTBs on Station, allocated
between several subgroups as follows: the Systems Group
will have about 300 CTBEs for their items (consisting of
almost entirely metal items, such as spare parts); Payloads
will have 100 CTBEs in addition to their racks; Medical
will have roughly 50 CTBEs; and Crew Provisions
(including clothing, hygiene items, etc., but excluding food
Figure 2.4: Food Container and water) will have 200.
Credit: Angela Hart, NASA
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Purchase of CTBs
Rothe Industries, of Houston, Texas, is the current manufacturer of the CTBs7 . Recent bags have
cost between $2500 and $5000; the latest Half CTB that was purchased from Rothe cost
approximately $3000. The bags are purchased through the Engineering Directorate at NASA
JSC. After purchase, ownership is transferred within JSC from Engineering to the OB
organization in the Mission Operations
Directorate, with JSC's OC organization as
the manager. OC, in turn, transfers the bags
to Lockheed Martin under the Cargo Mission
Contract (CMC), where they are managed in
practice by subcontractor MTC
Technologies. MTC's CTB group is led by
Mr. John Muzzy, and based in the Space
Station Processing Facility (SSPF) at KSC.
All CTBs are stored at KSC until they are
Figure 2.5: CTBs in 'Pink-Poly' on Storage Shelf at needed.
KSC (Credit: A. Grindle)
Storage at KSC
The CTBs in storage at Kennedy Space Center are kept in a climate-controlled environment.
They are folded / collapsed upon themselves into a relatively flat configuration, and then sealed
in "pink-poly" bags8 . A large number are stored in the CMC Bag & Tray Room in the SSPF, in
an automated storage & retrieval cabinet. Figure 2.5 is a photo of a bag on the automated storage
shelf; Figure 6 shows the automated storage and retrieval system.
Packing
In packing the CTBs for flight,
available volume is generally the
most significant limiting factor,
even more so than mass.
Whenever possible, the ground
tries to pack items that belong
together in a single CTB. This
allows the crew to simply store the
entire bag in the appropriate
location when it arrives at the ISS,
without any need to spend time
unpacking and sorting its contents.
Unfortunately, this is not always
possible; on Space Shuttle
middeck-only flights (no Multi-
Purpose Logistics Module, Figure 2.6: CTB Automated Storage & Retrieval System
MPLM) available packing volume (Credit: A. Grindle)
7 Rothe is also the contractor when any significant repairs to a bag are needed.
8 These pink-polyethylene bags are somewhat analogous to oversize Ziploc bags and anti-static wrap.
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is extremely limited, and items must be crammed into every possible space.
As illustrated in Figure 2.7, NASA CTBs are packed at both KSC and JSC. In Houston, JSC's
Flight Crew Equipment organization packs CTBs with all items that are designated as "Crew
Preference". JSC also packs the CTBs that are shipped to Russia for Progress or Soyuz flights;
NASA averages five or six Half CTBs on Progress launches and one or two on Soyuz flights.
Additionally, JSC packs food provisions into the metal food containers (Figure 2.4), which are
then generally packed into CTBs at KSC. Other hardware and supplies are also shipped to KSC,
where they are received, integrated into any additional containment that is specified'0 , and
packed into CTBs. The bags are generally packed three to five months prior to launch for
MPLM missions, as well as for ATV and HTV missions (for which KSC packs), and one month
in advance for middeck-only flights.
Bench Review
Before the packing is finalized and the bags passed from CMC to the Next-Level Integrator for
loading into the launch module, a Bench Review will be held at the packing location (either KSC
or JSC). At this review the flight crew, Integration Stowage Officers (ISOs), various hardware
owners, and packing engineers will come together to examine item labeling, containment,
grouping of like items, etc. After all outstanding issues have been resolved the bags will be
closed and transferred to the Next-Level Integrator (typically Boeing at KSC). If the CTBs
undergo a bench review at JSC and are then shipped to KSC for launch, they will not undergo a
second Bench Review.
JSCSSP
FlihtPreNASA CTB Flow
~ L~flpT'rm uem~KSC SSPF
F FedE
A. Guip.m.. Shipping & ReceMng
Bea Tray Room
FedE x
A. Grince, M.aahusets 1n-t"h.a Techolgy, 21 Jan 200B
Figure 2.7: CTB Pre-Launch Flow Diagram
9 Mass IS a significant limiting factor for US cargo on Russian flights; consequently, NASA tries to minimize Half
CTB use on these flights (as the bag adds roughly 1 kg) and keep the packed-bag mass under 10 kg.
' For example, John Muzzy's group cuts custom foam inserts to protect hardware that is to be packed in CTBs.
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Shipping
There are several transportation options that are used to move
cargo (both packed and unpacked) between NASA Centers, as
well as between NASA and its International Partners. FedEx is
frequently used for both domestic and international shipping.
In certain situations items are sent via FedEx Custom Critical,
for which a FedEx truck dedicated exclusively to the shipment
is driven straight from the pick-up site to the delivery location
(often JSC to KSC). The truck is temperature- and shock-
controlled, and its trailer is locked and sealed such that even the
driver cannot open it until arrival at the delivery location. On
rare occasions, NASA uses Southwest Airline's Counter-to-
Counter service, where items are transported onboard
Southwest's passenger jets.
For certain types of items, particularly food and medical/life
science objects, there is a need to monitor environmental
conditions during transport. There is also some concern
regarding environmental conditions related to shipping items to Figure 2.8: HOBOs
the international partners: Russia features many Customs (Credit: A. Grindle)
procedures, and shipments are sometimes exposed to low temperatures while waiting to clear;
Japan is, also anticipated to feature long waits and possible exposure to uncontrolled
environments; Europe is generally good about minimizing environmental exposure, although
heat and humidity are certainly concerns at Koreau.
A device known as a HOBO (Figure 2.8) is used to record temperature and relative humidity.
These monitors, which cost $50 to $100 each, travel in the shipment container. At the
destination, they are plugged into CMC's computers and the recorded environmental information
is downloaded. If specification conditions are exceeded or any other abnormalities are observed,
it is noted on the receiving paperwork" for the particular shipment. However, these records are
not directly associated with the entries of the affected cargo item in MAXIMO, IMS, or any
other database.
Unpacking on ISS
When cargo is delivered to the International Space Station, the crew must spend a significant
amount of time unloading and unpacking the Cargo Transfer Bags (CTBs). First, the CTBs must
be unloaded - removed - from the newly-arrived spacecraft and transferred to ISS. For shuttle
missions, it takes approximately 15 crew-hours to unload a middeck-only flight and 50 crew-
hours to unload a Multi-Purpose Logistics Module (MPLM). After the cargo is physically inside
the station, more time is required to unpack, sort, and/or store the new cargo. Unpacking
generally consumes 10-20 crew-hours for a middeck flight and 20-25 crew-hours for an MPLM
mission, with each packed item taking approximately 2 minutes to unpack and store. While the
crew is unpacking, Mission Control occasionally requests that they conduct an audit 2 of an
" Transportation Form DD-1 149 (KSC) or Form 290 (JSC)
12 Count the contents
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incumbent 3 CTB which must be opened anyways to store newly-arrived items. While such
audits add to the time required for unpacking, given the current architecture such a "touch-it-
once" strategy' 4 is the most efficient method to update or verify inventory levels.
When CTBs are emptied on ISS, they are folded down into a flat-like configuration and placed in
groups of three or four inside another CTB. Currently, there are between 50 and 60 empty CTBs
on-orbit. Occasionally, these bags are used to help package items for return to Earth.
Return & Cleaning
CTBs return to Earth aboard the Shuttle. When the vehicle arrives on the ground, the MPLM
(and/or middeck cargo) is transferred to the SSPF. In the SSPF High Bay, the Rack Insertion
Device is used to extract the racks from the MPLM. The racks - which "contain" or provide a
framework for the CTBs - are transferred to the MTL Technologies/CMC Bag & Tray Room,
where the CTBs are removed and unpacked. Returned hardware is wrapped in pink-poly and
packaged with foam as appropriate and shipped back to its owners.
Once emptied, the CTBs are inspected and cleaned. Typically, this cleaning is done in-house by
CMC; they remove any dirt or foreign fibers with tweezers, tape, and/or alcohol wipes. On rare
occasions when a bag is too badly soiled for this process, the group will immerse the CTB in a
vat of water and detergent. If a physical repair is needed, the bag will be sent to the
manufacturer, Rothe Industries, in Houston.
ISS INVENTORY MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS
As mentioned previously, cargo onboard ISS is currently managed by barcode. All items are
labeled with a barcode, either as individual items (such as a spare part) or a package of items
(such as a bag of screws). The crew, until recently, used a handheld barcode scanner to associate
an item with a particular bag or location in IMS. The scanner was also used to call up an item's
entry in IMS on the station's computers and change the status (i.e., to indicate usage).
Ostensibly, this barcode reader has been replaced with a PDA that is equipped to read barcodes
and connect to IMS via the station's Wi-Fi network' 5 , but reports indicate that in early 2008 the
crew was still using the old barcode scanner. The reason for this was unclear to ground
personnel at the time of these interviews. The US provided both the barcode scanners and the
PDAs, although both Russian and American crew members use this hardware.
Every day, each ISS crewmember is allocated 20 minutes each in the official mission timeline to
update IMS1 . This is in addition to any of their "personal time" that they might spend
performing the function. The 20 minutes is not necessarily intended to be used as a single block,
but rather to serve as a placeholder to reflect the amount of time that is spent on the task
throughout the day. Once per Flight Increment' 7 (twice per year), Mission Control asks the crew
to conduct a two-hour audit of particular items in order to update the inventory quantities and
usage rates. For example, the crew might be asked to count the number of clean t-shirts that
13 "Incumbent" meaning a CTB that is already on-orbit, that has not just arrived in the docked launch vehicle.
14 Auditing the contents of the CTB while it is out, rather than at another random time.
" 802.1 lb
16 It should be noted that the ISO in Mission Control often remotely updates IMS for the crew, based on crew
updates that are called down.
17 Typically a flight increment is six months long.
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remain (or food, office supplies, etc). The audit process involves taking all of the items out of a
particular CTB and counting them as they are placed in another (previously empty) CTB. On
average, this takes 20 minutes per bag. Given the very limited nature of available on-orbit crew
hours, as one NASA engineer pointed out that, "If we can take that 20 minutes and change it to
20 seconds [or eliminate it], we've done a tremendous amount of work for them."
Ground Support
The crew does receive significant ground support to assist them in maintaining IMS. At NASA
JSC, a number of engineers are employed as Integration Stowage Officers (ISOs). ISOs are part
of the Mission Operations Directorate; their central responsibility is to serve as the crew's point
of contact in Mission Control for inventory/stowage issues. They will answer questions from the
crew and also assist in updating IMS (entering changes as the crew calls them down, for
example). As of January 2008, there is always an ISO on console while the crew is awake; this
requires two ISOs per day each working an eight-hour shift' 8 (with one hour overlap for hand-
off). In addition, ISOs write stowage notes for on-orbit procedures; these notes describe where
the astronauts should find all the necessary items for a particular procedure, in addition to re-
stowage and/or disposal instructions (what and where) for the procedure's conclusion.
Supplementing the full-time ISO team is Ms. Ursula Stockdale, a NASA veteran who has
worked in the group since 1994 and was involved in the initial development of the CTBs after
the Shuttle-MIR program. Ms. Stockdale now works part-time (18 hours per week), and her
efforts are focused solely upon ISO Support. She describes her role as the "mother hen" in the
background who gets to see the big picture, cleaning up IMS and checking Delta files for errors,
watching for inventory trends over time, and leading on-orbit stowage planning for all new US
cargo.
Current Inventory Status / Missing Items
At the present time, there are approximately 13000 US items in IMS, spread throughout the
station in roughly 500 CTBs (and various other stowage mechanisms). Many of these CTBs
remain unopened after years on-orbit; in a typical day, only 10 to 15 CTBs are opened.
However, even with a limited number of bags being opened, a large number of inventory
transactions still occur - typically, NASA Houston exports two Delta files19 per day, each
containing roughly 400 IMS changes/updates. Occasionally they will export 5 or 6 files in a
single day. The Russians on the ground record far fewer transactions; they depend much more
heavily on their crew members to enter changes. An average Moscow Delta file will contain
about 20 changes - a "big" file will contain 80 or 90. Furthermore, Moscow has generated only
about 1400 Delta files, a little more than half as many as Houston or ISS.
Expiration dates are not currently tracked in an active fashion in IMS. As a consequence,
occasionally some items have expired on-orbit due to inaccurate usage rate projections. For
example, a group of utensil wipes exceeded their approved lifetime while on Station. Some
items can be used after their printed expiration dates, but some cannot - the final determination
is made by JSC's Engineering Directorate.
18 The two shifts are 2am - lOam and 9am - 5pm, CST
19 Recall that Delta files are used to synchronize the four IMS databases in Houston, Moscow, ISS, and Baikanour,
and contain only changes - not the entire database.
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Of the 13000 US items on-orbit, 3% are presently designated as "lost," meaning "stuff that we
[NASA] really have no idea where it is." Again, items are counted at a package level, so if one
package is lost which contains five t-shirts, it registers as a single lost item. Over the course of a
given year, it is estimated that roughly 10 crew hours are spent searching for some of these lost
items, and perhaps twice that effort for ground engineers. However, this can vary depending on
the importance of the item(s) misplaced. In one notable incident, a Pump Package Assembly -
measuring 20" x 20" x 36", roughly the size of a mini-fridge - was lost on-orbit. Two or three
crew hours were devoted to multiple searches, in addition to an "obscene" amount of personnel
time on the ground spent looking through IMS, discussing possibilities in meetings, etc. In the
end, the assembly was found in a cavity behind a panel aboard ISS; apparently a former crew had
deigned this to be a convenient storage location but neglected to update IMS or inform the
ground about it.
Trash
Trash on ISS is divided into three categories - Common trash, Russian trash20 , and NASA trash.
Common trash accounts for approximately two-thirds of the total trash generated on Station,
followed by Russian trash and then NASA trash. The disposal mechanism for almost all trash is
for it to be packed into the Progress prior to that vehicle's release from Station for bum-up in the
atmosphere. A small amount is also packed into the part of the Soyuz capsule that detaches and
bums-up during reentry. The U.S. and Russia split the "cost" of disposing of the Common trash,
and each is also responsible for the cost of their individual trash. Since trash is disposed of using
Russian vehicles, Russia manages this account and bills NASA for its share of the trash after
every disposal.
Common trash largely consists of three types of items, each of which makes approximately an
equal contribution to the total mass. These include 1) solid- and (older) liquid-waste containers
from the toilets, 2) liquid waste from the toilets, and 3) clothes/towels/hygiene items. The solid
waste containers are called KTOs, and are metal containers with a capacity of roughly 11.5 kg
each. Liquid waste containers are known as EDVs, and have a capacity of approximately 22 kg
each. EDVs are not discarded until they approach their design end-of-life; up to that point, their
contents are transferred to the Rodnik tanks that are built into the Progress for disposal. All
other common trash - the bulk of which consists of clothes, towels, and hygiene items, but which
also includes food wrappers and scraps, used Kleenex, and a variety of other miscellaneous items
- is placed in three other types of containers. The KBO-M is a rubberized cloth bag that serves
as a common trash waste-receptacle; the Food Waste bag is a small rubberized bag used
primarily for small and wet trash such as table scraps; and the Rubber-Lined Bag is a larger
rubberized cloth bag that can contain three KBO-Ms or eight Food Waste bags. Appendix B
contains pictures of each of the five types of waste containers.
NASA trash and Russian trash consist of items that are more clearly owned by one side or the
other, such as old hardware components. The two space agencies have their own independent
processes for approving the disposal of such trash; for NASA, the ISO in Mission Control
provides direction to the crew regarding what to throw out. Common trash, however, can be
disposed of (placed in waste containers) without needing any specific permission from the
20 Russian trash also includes what is sometimes called "FGB trash"
21 These tanks are also used to carry water up to the station; they have a capacity on the order of 200-400 kg.
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ground. Ground controllers find out about the disposal when the crew updates IMS (or calls
down to Houston to ask them to make the update), although this does not necessarily correspond
with the physical act of placing the trash in the receptacle. For example, when the crew takes a
bag of five t-shirts from the "pantry" and scans the barcode, IMS automatically switches the
status of those shirts to "trash" and records them as loaded into the Progress for disposal, even
though they are still in use on Station.
Roughly two weeks before the Progress vehicle is scheduled to undock, the Russian Space
Agency sends the crew a trash-disposal packing list, based on data from IMS. The crew will
then load the specified items and trash containers into the vehicle. There is, however, some
ambiguity about what is finally packed, especially when it comes to common trash, because the
crew loads both full waste bags (KBO-Ms, etc) and also individual pieces of trash. For example,
IMS might show that three packages-worth of t-shirts have been loaded into the vehicle, and the
crew themselves report that they have loaded five full KBO-Ms into the Progress; unfortunately,
that information alone does not make clear whether the t-shirts were contained within those
KBO-Ms or whether they were loaded separately, in addition to the five full KBO-Ms2 2 .
22 These KBO-Ms could contain other items not so finely tracked within IMS such as used tissues, hygiene products,
food scraps, etc.
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CHAPTER 3: FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF THE RAMSES CARGO TRANSFER BAG ON ISS
INTRODUCTION
This chapter develops a model that quantifies the costs and benefits of implementing the
RAMSES RFID-based inventory management system aboard the International Space Station,
and calculates the probabilistic Net Present Value (NPV) of the investment using Monte Carlo
simulations. Other authors have previously conducted cost-benefit analyses for RFID asset
tracking / inventory management systems that are applied to different environments. For
example, Adenso-Diaz and Gascon (1999) modeled the discounted cash flows associated with
the implementation of early-generation RFID tracking technology in a generic commercial
warehouse [19] and BearingPoint, Inc (2004) used Monte Carlo simulations to conduct a
probabilistic cost-benefit analysis of an RFID-based security and tracking solution for a
transoceanic supply chain [20]. Doerr, Gates, and Mutty (2006) analyzed the probable Return-
on-Investment (ROI) for a U.S. Department of Defense proposal to monitor ordnance with an
RFID/MEMS solution, evaluating quantitative costs and benefits of this proposed public
investment with Monte Carlo simulation. They also conducted sensitivity and risk analyses of
their results, to discover the probability that the project would generate a positive ROI [21]. The
work in this chapter builds most closely upon this last effort, using a similar methodology -
Monte Carlo simulation together with sensitivity analyses - but adapted and applied to the
unique environment of human spaceflight.
APPROACH
A Net Present Value (NPV) calculation allows the quantitative comparison of costs and benefits
that are uncertain and spread over time. Future dollars - costs (C) and/or benefits (B) that are
expected to accrue in N future years - are converted into present dollars through the use of a
discount rate, r (Equation 1). This discount rate typically is chosen to represent the rate of return
that would be obtained by investing the required capital into a stock/bond/fund/etc of comparable
risk, instead of investing it in the project.
N B -C,
NPV = [ 1]
= (1 +
For this analysis, a discount rate of 7% was used, as specified by the U.S. Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) in Circular No. A-94, Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost
Analysis of Federal Programs for base-case analysis of "public investments". According to
OMB, this rate "approximates the marginal pretax rate of return on an average investment in the
private sector in recent years." [22]
Also, this analysis was conducted through Fiscal Year 2016, the last year of NASA funding for
the Station according to the projections from NASA's 2004 planning document for the Vision for
Space Exploration [23]. The 2016 ISS retirement date remains the U.S. Government's baseline
as of the time of this work [24].
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METHODOLOGY
Figure 3.1, on the following page, summarizes the methodology employed in this analysis and
described below.
Simulation of Variables
Three distinct simulation techniques were used to calculate the net present value of the system,
and the results were compared. First, a discrete calculation of NPV was performed with input
variable values based upon the best information available. A sensitivity analysis was conducted
on this discrete scenario, and the results identified those uncertain variables with the most
significant impact upon the final net present value. Next, a 3,500-trial Monte Carlo NPV
simulation was conducted in which input values for high-impact uncertain variables were
randomly generated. These variables were generated with uniform distributions, each with a
range intended to span the set of reasonable values and centered near the "best-information"
value. Finally, another 3,500-trial Monte Carlo simulation was conducted to iterate the same set
of variables, but with normally-distributed input values. In this case, the distribution for each
variable was centered at or near the "best-information" value, and the standard deviation was set
so that the range of reasonable values would constitute 95% of the total range.
Implementation Scenarios
Two different hardware-implementation scenarios were studied in this work. In the first, the
system's net present value was calculated for a "Phase-In" scenario in which the RAMSES
RFID-wired CTBs would gradually replace the unwired CTBs on-orbit. This replacement would
take place as new, wired CTBs are launched to the ISS as part of already-scheduled logistics
missions and displace old, unwired bags already on-orbit.
However, further investigation revealed that - especially given the upcoming Shuttle retirement,
scheduled for 2010 - this Phase-In scenario might be unrealistic; the quantity of new CTBs that
are scheduled to be launched to ISS is predicted to be rather small [25]. Therefore, a second
scenario - the "Modification Kits" Scenario - was developed. In this scenario, modification kits
(mod-kits) would be launched all at once to the ISS, and the crew would retrofit CTBs that are
already on-orbit with the RAMSES RFID hardware. This analysis assumed that all kits would be
launched and installed in FY 2009, and that each kit would require 20 minutes of crew time to
install.
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Figure 3.1. Summary of analysis flow for each of the two RAMSES implementation scenarios.
Concentration of Inventory Transactions
Finally, multiple simulations were created to study the combined effects on net present value of:
1) a concentration of inventory transactions in some subset of the bags, and 2) a decision to
wire only that subset of the total ISS CTB population. Table 3.1 displays the combinations that
were studied. For example, in Scenario 4, the Monte Carlo simulation was conducted as if 50%
of the total inventory transactions were concentrated in the 25% of the CTBs which were
actually wired. In Scenario 9, 75% of the transactions occurred in the 50% of the CTBs which
were wired. Scenarios 1, 3, 6, and 10 assume that transactions are uniformly distributed
throughout all CTBs; in 1, 3, and 6 not all bags are wired, despite the absence of any
concentration of inventory transactions.
23 The occurrence of a disproportionate number of inventory transactions within some subset of CTBs, such as those
that contain office supplies, food, crew personal items, etc. JSC Engineers indicated that some concentration of this
nature does occur, but they do not have the data to quantify the phenomenon.
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Table 3.1. Map of inventory transaction concentration scenarios considered.
Launch Mod Kits (Best Ops Guess); Normally-Distributed Simulations
Effective % of CTBs Wred (As determined by concentration of transactions)
25% 33% 50% 75% 100%
Mean NPV %NPV Mean NPV %NPV Mean NPV %NPV Mean NPV % NPV Mean NPV % NPV
NPV Std. Dev. >0 NPV Std. Dev. >0 NPV Std. Dev. >0 NPV Std. Dev. >0 NPV Std. Dev. >0
25% Scenario I Scenario 2 Scenano 4 Scenario 7
Actual % 33A X X Scenario 3 ScenarioS Scenario 8 lx i X
Wired 50% x x x x Scenario 6 Scenario9 x x
100% x x x xji ij x x x Scenario 10
CALCULATING THE "VALUE" OF CREW TIME AND CARGO LAUNCH VOLUME
Often a cost/benefit analysis will deal with a system in which certain costs and/or benefits are not
readily expressed in the common units of value of the analysis. In such situations, one can
occasionally find indirect means of converting these elements into the common units of value,
although much caution is necessary; the decisions made in such a conversion process can
significantly impact the results of the analysis. In this study, it was necessary to convert two key
parameters - crew time and cargo volume launch capacity - into present dollars, the common
units of value.
"Value" of Crew Time
This analysis required a determination of the "value" of an astronaut's time onboard ISS. The
value of such time is an essential component of the analysis, because one of the most substantial
benefits of this system is its potential to reduce the amount of time the crew must spend updating
and maintaining the Station's inventory database. Such saved time represents a valuable resource
that could be invested in value-added activities such as scientific experiments. Time is also a
cost; for example, the time which the crew must spend to upgrade the CTBs with modification
kits (in one implementation scenario) must be added to the other "costs" associated with the
system in order to fairly balance costs against benefits.
Clearly, there are multiple approaches one could use to calculate the value of on-orbit crew time.
One could divide the total estimated cost of the Station by the total projected number of crew
hours through planned decommissioning in 2016. However, two factors make it difficult to
justify attributing the entirety of the total cost of ISS to the value of crew time. First, there are
other reasons for constructing the station besides providing a manned orbital laboratory, such as
gaining the experience of constructing such a massive structure in space, and doing so with an
international team. Second, there is the uncertainty as to whether or not the Station will actually
be retired in 2016.
An alternative method for determining this quantity would be to calculate the "productivity
value" of crew time, perhaps by dividing the estimated value of the eventual "products" of ISS
research by the total active crew time, or by the crew time devoted to experiments.
Unfortunately, it is all but impossible to calculate this estimated product value at the present
moment; one cannot predict the results of ISS research which might emerge over the next several
years. This is particular true because the vast majority of ISS research is "basic" or
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"fundamental" in nature, and such work generally occurs many years prior to any kind of
commercial product or application, although it is foundational to such developments.
Table 3.2. Calculation of value of crew time.
Year: 2009 2010-2016
# Crew:36
Avg. ISS Budget: $ 3,239556,135.77 35192587-47
# "Active" Crew Hours in a Day: 16
$ /'Active' Crew Hr: $ 184,906.17 $ 99,940.80
Instead, to calculate
the value of crew
time this analysis
took the combined
annual ISS
Operations budgets24
for NASA and all the
International Partners and divided that by the total number of "active" 25 crew hours per year to
arrive at a "$/active crew hour" figure. This figure was calculated both for the current station
configuration (current Operations budget divided by active time for three-member crew) through
2009 as well as for the Assembly Complete configuration (average projected annual Operations
budgets divided by active time for six-person crew) for 2010-2016. The details of these
calculations are shown in Appendix C, with results summarized in Table 3.2.
"Value" of Launch Cargo Volume and Mass
The other significant parameters which required a conversion to the common units of "value"
were the volume and mass of launched cargo. Contrary
for ISS Cargo is typically not launch mass, but rather,
launch volume; ISS cargo/logistics missions tend to fill
the available packing volume before filling the
available mass allocation. Consequently, one must
account for the "cost" of the cargo launch volume
required by RAMSES hardware (in addition to that of
its mass) in order to fairly evaluate the net present
value.26
To calculate the value
variable recurring cost
of cargo volume, the net
for all cargo missions in a
to popular belief, the primary limitation
Table 3.3. Calculation of value of
average cargo launch volume.
$ / m3 ('09-'10) $ 20,272,793.47
$ / M3 ('11-1_16) $ 31,598,719.79
Table 3.4. Calculation of value of
average cargo launch mass.
$/lb ('09-'10) $ 25,511.96
$/lb ('11-'16) $ 35,715.01
given year was divided by the total available cargo
24 That is, the ISS Operations budgets of NASA, JAXA, ESA, CSA, and RSA (or at least the best approximations
available), including the variable recurring cost of cargo/logistics flights. The cost of construction and construction
flights are excluded, as are indirect costs such as the overhead for the Space Shuttle program.
25 "Active" is defined here as non-sleeping hours. Again, the exact value that should be used for this metric could be
debated; should it include the crew's personal time and meal time, or only official "working" hours? Given the grey
area associated with the concept of "non-working hours" for a Space Station crew, and to conservatively minimize
the value of a unit of crew time, this analysis includes all active (non-sleeping) crew time in the value calculation.
26 Note that, for the sake of this analysis, it was assumed that the cargo launch volume required by RAMSES
hardware could be obtained either by adding an additional cargo flight(s) or by displacing other objects from
currently scheduled flights.
27 The cost of only the cargo mission/spacecraft, not including the overhead associated with any given launch
vehicle or program. Put another way, the incremental cost to launch one additional cargo mission. Note that this
cost varies substantially by vehicle. Given the uncertainty of international relations and how future developments
might impact the choice of vehicle for such an additional mission, an average cost per cargo mission was determined
and used, rather than the cost per mission of the lowest-cost vehicle.
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volume28  for such
missions, to generate a
"$/cubic-meter-of-
pressurized-cargo"
metric. The ISS logistics
flight schedule from 2008
to 2016 gave the
necessary information
regarding the planned
flight schedule and
vehicle mix [26]. Also,
as detailed in Table 3.3,
two values for this
quantity were calculated
- one for 2009-2010
(prior to Shuttle
retirement), and one for
2011-2016 (after Shuttle
retirement).
Table 3.5. List of general input variables for Modification Kits
Implementation Scenario.
FY 2009
Cost to Mdify I CrB for RFID System ($): $ 3,000.00
Cost ofHardvare Compnents for I RFID System() 3,000.00
Mass of RFID System (bs): 4
Vohme of Standard CIB (m3): 0.053
% of Standard CIB Volume required by RFID System: 12%
Time Required for Astronauts to Modify I CIB (hr): 1/3
Number of CIBs upgraded by OrnOrbit Crew 600
Cost of I NASA Engineer Person-Year (Salary + Overhead): $ 200,000.00
# NASA Engineer FLrson-Years for Flight Certification Testing & Review 7
# NASA Engineer Person-Years for Opertional Mainteance (per year): 2
# ISOs Employed to Cowr I Console Shift / Day, 365 Days / Yr. 6
First Year to Realize Benefits: 2010
Final Year of ISS Operations: 2016
% On-orbit IMS Fntries that could be Autonated by Wred CIBs: 50%
% of CTB Transactions Aceirately Detected by System 95%
SYSIEMEFFECVENESS(%) for those CIBs that are Wired: 48/
The launch cost ($) per unit of cargo mass was calculated similarly to the cost per unit of cargo
volume, and is detailed in Table 3.4 and Appendix C. 29 Also, a discussion of the decision to
count the cost of both launch mass and volume is included in the final section of this chapter.
GENERAL INPUT VARIABLES
Several other quantities were used in this analysis, as summarized in Table 3.5 for the
Modification Kits Implementation Scenario. The estimated cost for the CTB vendor (Rothe
Industries, of Houston, Texas) to retrofit and install such hardware in one CTB, or for the
developer to build a modification kit for on-orbit installation (both estimated at $3000), was
input into the model. Also, the estimated mass and cost ($3000) of one set of RAMSES
hardware components - necessary to upgrade one CTB - was entered. The hardware cost is
based upon a conservative estimate from the RAMSES development team at Aurora Flight
Sciences / Payload Systems, while the installation or modification kit estimate is based upon the
cost of a new CTB ($2500 - $5000) [27].
Two other elements included the volume of a standard CTB (0.053 M3), and the estimated
percentage of that volume that would be required by the RAMSES hardware. This percentage
was calculated based on extrapolation from current prototype efforts.30
28 Note that the actual volumetric figure used is "pressurized cargo volume," due to inconsistent reporting of the
desired figure-of-merit by International Partners. The actual cargo volume available to be packed is typically less
than the pressurized cargo volume, as certain vehicles - such as the ATV, HTV, and MPLM - include space for
astronaut ingress and egress. Furthermore, all bags and other packed objects must be secured within the transport
vehicle, most commonly within a rack or frame. With the possible exception of the Progress Ml, the vehicles are
not simply packed to maximum volumetric capacity.
29 The net recurring launch cost for all cargo flights was divided by the total available cargo mass to determine
"$/lb-cargo-mass-launched". This was calculated to be roughly $25,000 per lb prior to Shuttle retirement, and
$35,000 per lb after Shuttle retirement. See Appendix C for details.
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Still other inputs included the estimated number of CTBs that would be upgraded or replaced on-
orbit, and the estimated crew time required to upgrade or replace a single bag (which consists of
either installing a modification kit or transferring contents from an old bag to a new, wired bag).
This latter estimate - 20 minutes - was based upon the amount of time that it takes the crew to
unpack a new CTB that arrives on-orbit containing items that must be distributed among existing
CTBs [1].
The total cost (including overhead) of one NASA Engineer-Year was entered as approximately
$200,000 [28]. The number of NASA Engineer-Years required for RAMSES flight certification
and review was estimated to be 7 (in FY 2009), and for recurring RAMSES operations and
maintenance this value was set to 2 (per year, 2009-2016). Also, 12 Engineer-Years are
currently devoted to Integration Stowage Officer (ISO) activities. 3 '
Finally, a System Effectiveness parameter, p, was created to account for the fact that the system
will not automate 100% of all inventory transactions. This is due to two factors: 1) some
inventory transactions cannot be automated with the proposed system architecture 32, and 2) the
system will have some errors, and will not be able to detect 100% of those transactions which it
could automate. Therefore, as shown in Equation 2, the System Effectiveness parameter is
merely the product of a, the percentage of inventory transactions which the system can automate
(best estimate is 50%, as explained in footnote 32) and pi, the percentage of those transactions
which the system does accurately detect (reasonable estimate is 95%, as detailed in Chapter 4).
Therefore, the best estimate value for P is 47.5%.
p = a xp (2)
RESULTS FROM DISCRETE CALCULATIONS
Table 3.6 shows that, when using "best-information" values for all input variables in the
Modification Kits Implementation Scenario, and assuming no concentration of transactions and
that 100% of ISS CTBs will be wired, the system has a net present value of almost $15 million.
Table 3.7 shows that, by contrast, for the Phase-In Scenario, a discrete calculation of the
system's net present value shows a negative NPV of roughly $63 million.
30 The initial RAMSES CTB implementation consumes approximately 25% of the total volume of a standard CTB,
mostly due to an overly conservative (large) amount of foam insulation used to provide separation from the metallic
shielding that lines the CTB and electromagnetically isolates the interior from the outside environment. Further
system optimization and use of a more advanced insulation material are projected to reduce this required volume;
12% of the standard CTB volume is chosen as the best estimate value for this variable.
3 It is estimated that a 100% efficient system of wired CTBs could automate 50% of the inventory transactions
onboard Station, which in turn is estimated to be 25% of the ISO workload [25].
32 Some transactions will "end" - or take place entirely - outside of a wired CTB, where the destination / final-status
of the object cannot be detected by the system. For example, an astronaut could remove a new shirt from a wired
CTB and take it to his/her living space. The RAMSES system would record the shirt's disappearance from the CTB,
but the crew would still have to manually enter the destination of the shirt into the Inventory Management System
(IMS) database. This analysis makes the conservative assumption that all transactions follow this pattern (ie, end or
begin outside the coverage of a wired CTB), and thus only 50% of transactions can be automated.
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However, one must realize that some of
these "best-information" values are still
quite uncertain. Consequently, the
probabilistic Monte Carlo simulations
that follow are more reliable indications
of value.
VARIABLE SELECTION FOR MONTE
CARLO SIMULATIONS
Table 3.6. Discrete NPV Simulation for Mod-Kits
Implementation Scenario.
Implementation Scenario NPV - Discrete Simulation
Modification Kits $ 14,769,006.75
Table 3.7. Discrete NPV Simulation for Phase-In
Implementation Scenario.
Implementation Scenario NPV - Discrete Simulation
Phased-in $ (63,065,612.21)
As mentioned previously, a sensitivity analysis was conducted based upon the results of the
discrete NPV calculation (which used best-estimate input values for all variables and the
modification kit implementation scenario). This analysis determined those variables with the
most significant impact upon the calculated net present value. Using Microsoft Excel's data
table feature, each variable - one at a time - was iterated through a range of reasonable values,
with a new NPV calculated for each iteration. Then, the sensitivity of NPV to each variable was
calculated as the average ratio of the percentage change in NPV to the corresponding percentage
change in the iterated variable (X), as expressed in Equation 3.
JNPV I - NPV O|
NPV 0
X, -0
| X 0 ' (3)
The results of this analysis revealed that seven variables clearly impacted the final NPV result
substantially more than the rest. Table 3.8 summarizes this difference in sensitivity for the
Modification Kits Scenario. Interestingly, the NPV of the system is most sensitive to the percent
of CTB volume which the RAMSES hardware requires (19.63), a physical characteristic of the
system, and then to the read-rate accuracy of the hardware (13.39), the key technical
performance characteristic.
Of the seven variables with the greatest impact, six were subsequently randomly generated for
the Monte Carlo simulations, while the seventh - "# of CTBs On-Orbit that are to be wired" -
was iterated via distinct Monte Carlo simulations in conjunction with the concentration of
transactions in a subset of CTBs, as previously specified in Table 3.1.
The relative sensitivities of the variables for the Phase-In Scenario (see Appendix C for table) are
generally the same as for the Modification Kits Scenario. The most notable exception is that the
rate at which CTBs are launched is also a high-impact variable.
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v annivic cummarv
vanarne,
Number of Crew (2010+):
Avg. ISS Budget (2009-2016:
# "Active" Crew Hours Per Day:
RFID System Weight bs):
Cost to Modify I CTB for RFID System (add pockets, insulation, install electronics):
Discount Rate:
Time Required for Astronauts to Transfer CTB Contents to new CTB (hr):
Number of CTBs upgraded by On-Orbit Crew'
# of CTBs On-Orbit that are to be wired:
% On-orbit IMS Entries that could be Automated by Wired CTBs:
% of CTB Transactions Accurately Detected by System:
Percent of Standard CTB volume required for RFID System:
Volume Cost ($ / m3
CALCULATION OF COSTS
Modification Kits Implementation Scenario
For the implementation scenario which consisted of launching modification kits in FY 2009 to
retrofit on-orbit CTBs, there were six non-recurring costs which were calculated for FY 2009.
The only recurring cost in this scenario was the NASA Engineer time to support system
maintenance and operations, and it was charged for FY 2009 - FY 2016 and discounted as
shown in Equation 1. The six non-recurring costs included the real costs or opportunity costs of:
0 Hardware components
e Building and preparing the modification kits
e NASA Engineering time for the flight certification testing and approval process
* Launching the system mass
* Launching the system volume
e The crew time needed to install the modification kits on-orbit.
Phase-In Implementation Scenario
In the second implementation scenario, RFID-wired CTBs would gradually replace unwired
units as they were launched according to the existing cargo flight schedule. In this scenario,
most costs are recurring; the only one-time cost is that of the NASA Engineering time required
for RAMSES flight certification testing and review, charged in FY 2009. The recurring charges,
spread evenly from FY 2009 to FY 2016 and discounted according to Equation 1, include the
real costs or opportunity costs of:
* Hardware components
* Vendor modification of the CTBs and installation of the RAMSES hardware
e NASA Engineering time to support system maintenance and operations
e Launching the system mass (different for pre- and post-Shuttle Retirement)
e Launching the system volume (also different for pre- and post-Shuttle Retirement)
e The crew time needed to transfer contents from old bags to new bags on-orbit (different
for crew of 3 in FY 2009 and crew of 6 in FY 2010 - FY 2016).
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CALCULATION OF BENEFITS
Modification Kits Implementation Scenario
All benefits are recurring and appropriately discounted to present value. Furthermore, benefits
do not start to accrue until FY 2010, under the assumption that there is some delay time - time
required for initial system approval, launch, and set-up - between project initiation and the first
realization of benefits. The vast majority of the quantified benefits result from saving crew time
that would otherwise be spent on inventory management tasks. These savings include part of the
time the crew spends searching for lost items (roughly 10 hours per year), conducting inventory
audits33 (roughly 4 hours per year per crew member), and updating the Station's Inventory
Management System (officially scheduled as 20 minutes per day per crew member) [1]. The
other benefit derives from saving NASA Engineer time by reducing the workload of the
Integration Stowage Officers on the ground at JSC, specifically the time spent assisting the crew
with IMS updates [25]. Collectively, these benefits are realized according to the System
Effectiveness (P) parameter; for a p of 50%, the benefits credited to the RAMSES system are
50% of the total possible.
Phase-In Implementation Scenario
The only difference between the two implementation scenarios in terms of the calculation of
benefits is that with the gradual deployment of CTBs, benefits are realized more slowly. For
example, if - starting in FY 2009 - the number of wired CTBs launched every year is equal to
10% of the total ISS CTB population, then in FY 2010 the benefits realized will be 10% of those
calculated by the System Effectiveness (p) parameter. In FY 2011, the benefits will be 20% of
the P parameter, in FY 2012, they will be 30%. This stands in contrast to the Modification Kits
scenario, in which it is assumed that - if all bags are intended to be wired - 100% of the benefits
allowed by the P parameter will be realized every year, starting in FY 2010. Note that the
benefit calculation method for the Phase-In scenario also assumes that all wired CTBs launched
in a given year will not yield benefits until the following year. Due to the uncertainty of launch
dates and installation schedules, this conservative assumption was necessary; however, one
should recognize that it does cause some loss of present value in the overall analysis for this
scenario.
RESULTS OF MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS
Modification Kits Implementation Scenario
The results from the Monte Carlo normal distribution and Monte Carlo uniform distribution
simulations for the Modification Kits Implementation Scenario are summarized on the next page
in Tables 3.9 and 3.10.
33 Counting the numbers of various supplies to verify IMS records
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Table 3.9. Summary of probabilistic NPV Monte Carlo simulations for Modification Kits Implementation
Scenarios with normally-distributed variables.
Launch Mod Kits (Best Ops Guess); Normtly.Distributed Simulations
Effective % of CThs Wired (As deterined by concentration of transactons)
25% 33% 1-50% 175% 100%
%NPV ~ %NPV ~
I NPV Std. Dew. I >o I F4PVStd.Dev.I >o I NPV SId. Dew.
% NPV Mean PV % NPV Mean NPV I% NPV
Is I NPV Std. Dev. > n PVStd. Dev. > :o
2%$ (6028,603.41 37 44652 $ 49,435,199.17 $ 1 03 ,185, 4 . 7 x
$ 19,313,461.96 $ 23,066,435-14 $ 30,550,819.73 $ 44,754,456.13 x
33 $ S 6035666.201 $ 29,780,636.00 $ 85,406,626.04 xActual % % S 6035 82% _________ [-CIxs _ $ 25,918,469.55 $ 32,852,633.72 $ 46,558.196.89 x
xx (7,233,783.26 $ 46,835,438.82 x
NOx x$ 38,902,427.71 4 $ 48,677,956.2 K
x xx $13,223,978.27)43
100% x x x x $ 77,414,934 3%
Table 3.9 illustrates that - from a probabilistic stand-point - the system is slightly more likely to
have negative present value than it is to have positive present value, unless there is some
concentration of transactions. For example, if 50% of the Station's CTBs are wired in FY 2009
and there is no concentration of transactions (ie, the Effective % of CTBs Wired is also 50%),
the system has a negative mean NPV of roughly $7.2 million with standard deviation of $38.9
million, and 43% of the 3500 Monte Carlo trials resulted in a positive net present value.
Table 3.10. Summary of probabilistic NPV Monte Carlo simulations for Modification Kits Implementation
Scenarios with uniformly-distributed variables.
Launch Mad Kits (Best Ops Guess); Unifornmy-Distnuted Simulations
Effective % of CTBs wired (As determined by concentration of transactions)
25% 3Ma3% 50% 75a 10
Mean NPV % NPV Mean NPV
NPV Std. Dev.
% NPV Mean NPV
NPV Std. Dev.
% NPV Mean NPV %NPV Mean NPV % NPV
NPV Std. Dev. > 0 NPV Std. Dev. > 0
-. I.-.-- - -
25% 4988.621.31 1282123309 69% S 49 421093.27 93% 104,029,505.01 gX X$ 22,676,233.15 $ 26,003,258.04 $ 36,047.800.42 $ 50,905,190.09 x
Actual S 33% x $ (5,532,217.58) 43% $ 30,897,496.47 $ 84,776,04188 96% XX
x $ 29,958,138.37 $ 38,032,301.86 $ 53,581,297.13 x
Wired 50% x x $ (5,665,293.53) $ 48,579,152.53 0% x
x x $ 45,112.372.95 $ 57,779,083.53 x
100% K S 0,72428.54
L ~ x0 x XXX xX $ .90,427,908.60 48
However, Table 3.9 also shows
that a modest concentration of
inventory transactions - say,
75% occurring in the 50% of
the bags that are wired34 _
results in a positive mean NPV
of approximately $46.8 million
with standard deviation of
$48.7 million, and 84% of the
3500 trials resulting in a
positive net present value.
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Figure 3.2. Histogram of NPV Monte Carlo simulation (normally-
distributed variables) for Modification Kits Scenario with 100% of
CTBs wired.
34 This corresponds to an "Effective % of CTBs Wired" of 75% and "Actual % of CTBs Wired" of 50%.
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Table 3.10, mirrors this trend, with values similar to that of Table 3.9. Figure 3.2 shows the
results, in histogram form, from the Monte Carlo simulation in which 100% of the CTBs are
wired (Scenario 10 in Table 3.1); Figure 3.3 is the cumulative distribution function from the
same simulation. Together, these charts illustrate the likelihood of various net present value
outcomes.
II
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Figure 3.3. Cumulative distribution function of NPV Monte Carlo simulation (normally-distributed
variables) for Modification Kits Scenario with 100% of CTBs wired.
Phase-In Implementation Scenario
Results for the Phase-In Implementation Scenario - including the discrete, Monte Carlo normal
distribution, and Monte Carlo uniform distribution simulations - are summarized below in Tables
3.11 and 3.12.
Table 3.11. Summary of probabilistic NPV Monte Carlo simulations for Phase-In Implementation Scenarios
with normally-distributed variables.
In Table 3.11, one finds that probabilistic simulations reinforce the early indication of the
discrete case; namely, that the Phase-In Implementation Scenario - as modeled in this work - is
inferior to the implementation of the system via Modification Kits. Also illustrated in Table 3.11
is the trend of greater value given a concentration of transactions in a subset of CTBs and the
decision to equip only those bags. Table 3.12, below, shows that the same patterns hold true
when the random Monte Carlo variables are generated with uniform distributions.
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Table 3.12. Summary of probabilistic NPV Monte Carlo Simulation for Phase-In Implementation Scenarios
with uniformly-distributed variables.
Phase-in Scenao; Uniformly-DistributedSimulations
Effective % of CTs Wired (As determined by concentration of transactions)
25% 33% 50% 75% 100%
Mean NPV % NPV Mean NPV % NPV Mean NPV % NPV Mean NPV % NPV Mean NPV % NPV
NPV Std. Dev. >0 NPVStd. Dev. >0 NPV Std. Dev. > 0 NPV Std. Dew. >0 NPV Std. Dev. > 0
25% $ (7,134,901.40) $ 8,086,65191 $ 39,310,272.91 $ 86,606,752.87 x
2%35% 86366%-9 90%y w
$ 19,473,842.81 $ 23,177,847.08 $ 31,333,709.97 $ 45,682,016.38 x
Actual% 33% x 12,751,239-25 3 15,601,043.64 58,380,146.70 92% x
_x $5 S 24,174,562.15 $ 30,746,874.57 $ 44,146,080.07 1 X
Wifed 5 X x $ 127,684,820.39) - $ 7,094,984.10 55% x
x x_ - $ 32,320,417.50 $ 42,237,607.25 x
x x x x 60.099.581.86
x x x x $ 45,296,435.62
CONCLUSIONS
Based on the best information available and the assumptions detailed above, this analysis
suggests that the RAMSES system is likely to yield positive net present value if implemented in
International Space Station CTBs via modification kits installed by the crew, provided that
inventory transactions are at least somewhat concentrated within the subset of CTBs in which the
hardware is installed. As one would expect, the more the inventory transactions are concentrated
into a smaller percentage of CTBs, the greater the value delivered by the system (assuming that
installation is limited to those bags).
This result is intuitive, given that the largest costs associated with the system are directly tied to
the quantity of CTBs that are equipped with RFID. The three largest costs are the opportunity
costs for the launch volume (~42% of the total cost for the discrete analysis of the Modification
Kits Implementation Scenario), launch mass (~33%)35, and crew time to install the modification
kits36 (~21%). On the benefits side of the equation, the single term that dominates is the value of
the crew time saved that would otherwise be spent on routine updates of the Inventory
Management System 37. The value of this saved time accounts for roughly 94% of the total
benefits accrued by the system in the discrete analysis of the Modification Kits Implementation
Scenario.
Also intuitive is the fact that the Modification Kits Implementation Scenario performs better than
the Phase-In Scenario. This is a result of the fact that the modification kits are modeled as being
launched and installed in FY 2009, and thus from FY 2010 - FY 2016 the full, recurring benefits
of the system are able to add up and overcome the initial one-time costs associated with launch
and installation. If the lifetime of the Station were to be extended - as was recommended in a
recent MIT study [29] and favored by the Presidentially-appointed Augustine Commission [30] -
the recurring benefits would further accumulate; the net present value of all scenarios would
3 A discussion of the decision to count the cost of both mass AND volume is included in the next, final section of
this chapter.
36 OT to transfer contents to wired CTBs that are being phased-in.
7 The official NASA timeline devotes 20 minutes per day per crewmember to this activity, which - for a crew of six
- amounts to 730 hours per year (1).
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increase, and it would become much more probable that the Phase-In Scenario would result in
positive net present value.
It should be understood that at least one potential cost and one potential benefit were not
included in this study, as they could not be quantified rationally. The cost of integrating the
RAMSES system into the International Space Station's existing Inventory Management System
is extremely uncertain. IMS currently has the capability to receive and process input from
external devices, such as barcode readers, but the difficulty involved in scaling this capability, or
supplementing the current system with a separate RAMSES software module that simply feeds
updates to the current, is quite uncertain. There is also a political challenge associated with such
modifications, namely to obtain approval from all International Partners.
The unquantifiable benefits of this work include the enhancement of both crew safety and
mission assurance. The ability to locate any item (or at least many items and/or any critical
items, depending on the extent of implementation) at a moment's notice can potentially make the
difference between life and death in an emergency situation. Furthermore, real-time knowledge
of stock levels of supplies such as food, medicine, and spare parts can prevent unexpected stock-
outs that could jeopardize crew health and/or Station reliability.
Clearly, NASA decision-makers and their international counterparts must carefully weigh all of
these factors in their evaluation of this technology. There are substantial benefits associated with
this proposed application of RAMSES, but also significant costs, challenges, and uncertainties.
Alternative hardware architectures - such as tagging all items but installing a fixed network of
RFID readers and antennas rather than wiring and insulating all CTBs - might provide even
greater value by requiring less mass and volume, if challenges such as location triangulation and
EMF interference could be overcome. At the very least, this analysis demonstrates that an RFID
inventory management system merits serious consideration for future human spaceflight
applications.
LIMITATIONS, CONSERVATIVE ASSUMPTIONS, AND FUTURE WORK
A brief final note seems appropriate regarding the limitations of this analysis and the
conservative assumptions used herein. Two pieces of information proved particularly difficult to
locate for this project. First, it was very difficult to obtain any financial information relating to
the contributions of the Russian Space Agency to ISS. No reference at all could be found
regarding their ISS Operations budget, yet their level of activity in this area is second only to that
of NASA. Furthermore, the only cost data that could be obtained for the Progress M1 spacecraft
was that NASA's most recent contract with RSA specifies a price of $40.1 million per metric ton
for cargo delivery via Progress [31]. This figure was multiplied by the maximum capacity of the
vehicle (2230 kg) [32] to arrive at an approximate variable recurring cost per mission of $89.4
million. This figure was then multiplied by the number of missions scheduled (4 in 2008 and
2009) [26] for an annual cargo flight contribution of $360 million (paid in part by NASA).
Based on this, a figure of $550 million was used as the total annual ISS Operations financial
contribution of RSA, but there is no solid basis for this figure. The actual value could be
substantially higher, which would result in a positive increase of net present value for all
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implementations of the system.38 It seems unlikely that the actual figure is lower than that used
here. Thus, the assumption made to compensate for this limitation was conservative in nature.
Second, the ISS Operations budgets for all other International Partners (IPs) proved almost as
elusive. However, in the ISS Program's document entitled Cost Analysis Requirements
Description (CARD), the negotiated percentage contributions of each Partner to the Common
Systems Operations (CSO) Costs 39 - "the costs to operate the ISS" - were detailed [33]. NASA
agreed to pay 76.6% of CSO Costs, JAXA - 12.8%, ESA - 8.3%, and CSA - 2.3%. (As for the
Russians, the document only said that "Russian support of their segment and their crewmembers
would equal their CSO Costs obligations [34].") Unfortunately, no dollar amount was provided
for any one of these percent contributions. Thus, to calculate each Partner's budget, it was
assumed that NASA's ISS Operations budget - as detailed in the agency's FY 2009 Budget
Request [35] - represented NASA's 76.6% share of the CSO Costs. This assumption, in turn,
allowed calculation of the total CSO Costs, including the specific dollar contributions of all other
Partners. However, these figures seem likely to be overly conservative; the NASA ISS
Operations budget does not account for the costs associated with launching crew members via
the Space Shuttle, and therefore the actual value of NASA's percentage contribution to CSO
Costs might be moderately to significantly higher than simply the NASA ISS Operations budget
line (of roughly $2.06 billion in FY 2009 [35]). Again, if the actual combined ISS Operations
costs are greater than those values used in this analysis, the consequence would be an increased
value for crew time, and thus an increased likelihood of greater positive net present value for the
RAMSES system - in either implementation scenario. Therefore, as with the previous
assumption, this one is also conservative.
Finally, there could be a legitimate debate regarding the method used in this paper to calculate
the opportunity cost of cargo launch volume and mass. One could argue that this method
imposes a "double" cost for any launched object, by dividing the total (non-recurring) vehicle
cost among its payload mass capacity to calculate a "$ / lb" figure, and then again dividing the
total vehicle cost among its pressurized payload volumetric capacity to calculate a "$ / in3,
figure. Each launched object is then charged for both. Some might suggest that the vehicle cost
should instead be split between the two characteristics, or distributed between them in some
other manner, because the utilized method would charge twice the actual cost of the vehicle if
applied to a single launch that is at maximum capacity for both mass and volume. However, this
method was the most conservative of the many options available, and thus places the greatest
value upon minimizing hardware volume and mass. It protects against scenarios in which
opportunity costs might be under-represented; for example, if a vehicle is packed to its
volumetric capacity with large but low-mass objects, a different accounting method could result
in the net opportunity cost of launching those objects coming to only a portion of the actual non-
recurring cost of the vehicle. The conservative approach adopted here is consistent with that
utilized throughout this work.
3 An increase of the total annual ISS Operations Cost results in an increase in the calculated value of crew time,
according to the method used here; this, in turn, increases the Net Present Value of the overall system because crew
time makes up ~94% of the system's recurring benefits and only 21% of the (non-recurring) cost.
.9 Include costs to transport and return crew and common supplies ("crew members, food, clothing, air, water, health
care items, propellant," etc), and ground operations costs ("integrated planning, mission control, integrated L&M,
POIC (Payload Operations & Integration Control?), and launch processing for CSO Cost cargo") [331.
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There exist numerous opportunities for future work that builds upon this analysis. It would
certainly be useful to re-examine the results if one or both of the missing pieces of data,
mentioned above, could be obtained. Also, it would be interesting to apply this analysis to other
proposed automated inventory management architectures for ISS, and very straightforward to do
so. Additional work could also be done to clarify the technical and political integration
challenges associated with implementing such a system on Station, particularly those related to
the Inventory Management System. This last is perhaps the most significant cost uncertainty
inherent in this work. On the benefits side, however, one could also attempt to quantify the
amount and value of enhanced crew safety and mission assurance that would result from this
kind of asset management system. As another direction for future research, this cost benefit
analysis framework could also possibly be extended and applied more generally to other types of
technology infusion problems. Finally, there also is room for continued technology development
work in regards to both the RAMSES system itself, and the more general passive RFID tag
environment, especially in regards to improving detection rates for tags affixed to or near metal
and/or liquid objects.
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CHAPTER 4: PERFORMANCE TESTING OF THE RAMSES CTB PROTOTYPE IN NORMAL- AND
REDUCED-GRAVITY
INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 3, we quantitatively examined the value proposition of the RAMSES RFID-based
inventory management system. A model was constructed that quantified the costs and benefits
of deploying RAMSES "smart CTBs" aboard the International Space Station, and also calculated
the probabilistic Net Present Value for the investment using Monte Carlo simulations. The
analysis determined that, for ISS, the key to realizing a positive return-on-investment was to
implement the system in a targeted manner that would capture the greatest number of inventory
transactions with the smallest deployment of the RFID system, while also minimizing system
volume and mass and maximizing performance [36].
This chapter describes the results and implications of extensive testing of the RAMSES CTB
prototype. Experiments were conducted to characterize the system's performance over a wide
range of operational scenarios, both on the ground and in a reduced gravity environment (-.02
g). The reduced gravity testing in particular raised the system TRL to Level 6 and provided
crucial information regarding the bounds of system performance for MIT/Aurora/NASA
evaluation efforts and Phase III development work. In addition to gravity, other experimental
variables included the material composition of the simulated cargo items (paper, metal, or
liquid), the number of cargo items within the container at one time, the orientation of the cargo
items, and the method by which the passive RFID tags were attached to the cargo items.
EXPERIMENTAL SETUPS
Three different types of experiments were conducted in this effort to characterize the
performance of the RAMSES Double-CTB prototype, as summarized in Table 4.1. Experiment
1, conducted in standard laboratory conditions at 1g, tested the system performance while the
reader was in "snapshot" mode - that is, it conducted a single scan of the contents of the CTB,
and reported those tags detected by that single scan. This first set of tests also examined the
effect of tag orientation on reader accuracy, consisted of the largest number of trials, and used
only AlienTm Gen II passive RFID tags (both as packaged and with supplemental foam
backings). Experiment 2 was ground-based, consisting of Ig replications of the test sequence
that would subsequently be repeated in micro-gravity. These 1g simulations were conducted
with the RFID reader scanning the CTB contents continuously for 20 seconds, and then reporting
the total number of unique tags that had been detected during that period. All test articles had
been placed into the CTB in "random" orientations, and both Alien and Omni-ID tags were
tested. Finally, Experiment 3 replicated the test matrix of Experiment 2, but in micro-gravity
conditions aboard the ZeroG Corporation / NASA Reduced Gravity Office 727 parabolic flight
campaign of August 2009. Across all three tests, the common variables included both the
number and material-type of the RFID-tagged test articles that were placed into the CTB.
Table 4.1. Variables across experiment setups.
Gravity Reader Mode Tag Types Tag Orientations (to CTB base)
Experiment I Ig "Snapshot" Alien 3(parallel, perpendicular, random)
Experiment 2 1g 20s continuous Alien, Omni-ID 1 (random)
Experiment 3 -.02 g 20s continuous Alien, Omni-ID 1 (random)
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RESULTS
Experiment 1
As described above, Experiment 1 was conducted in standard laboratory conditions at 1g, and
included the most comprehensive set of tests with five trials conducted for each unique
combination of variables. Four different independent variables were examined over the course
of the experiment, including:
" Material of tagged objects (paper, liquid, metal, and an equal mix of the three)
* Number of tagged objects within the CTB at one time (6, 12, 18, 24, 30)
" Orientation of tagged objects within the CTB (tags parallel, perpendicular, or
randomly oriented with respect to the floor panel of the CTB)
* Tag mounting scheme (directly on the object, directly on a plastic bag that contained
the object, or mounted on a roughly %-inch-thick piece of foam which was then
attached to a plastic bag containing the object.
Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 illustrate the various test articles and tag mounting schemes.
Figure 4.1. Tissue, bag & foam tag mount. Figure 4.2 Metal can, direct mount. Figure 4.3. Water, bag mount.
The macro-level results from this testing were several, and are illustrated in Figures 4.4-4.8.
First, all other factors equal, paper objects were the easiest to read, and in most cases metals were
easier to read than liquids. Second, in general, as the number of tagged objects in the CTB
increased, the percentage of objects that were "missed" by the reader also increased. Third,
among the three tag orientations tested, randomized (chaotic) orientations of the tags within the
CTB generally produced the highest read accuracy. (This result prompted the idea of
characterizing performance in reduced-gravity.) Fourth, the impact of the tag mounting scheme
varied significantly with the material of the test article. For paper, each of the three tag
mounting approaches worked equally well. However, for metals and liquids, only the foam and
bag mounting approach (as shown in Figure 4.1) generated read rates of 75% or better (18 test
articles or less, random orientation). Directly-tagged metal objects (Figure 4.2) did not read at
all, and metals and liquids with tags mounted directly on the plastic bags (Figure 4.3) saw read
rates of between 25-70%, depending on the material and number of objects.
( 50 )
Paper (in bags)
100.0% - ---- - - - --- 
9001.
BOB ......-.- -.-- .--- ----- --
70.0%
50.0 -- --- - a Parallel
40.0%S . .. _ _ __.. _ Urerpendcular
2 Random
10.0%
6 12 1s 24 30
Number of Test Artides bi ClB
Liquids (in bags w/ foam)
1000% - -------
'290D0%
800%- - - --- -- ---- ---
8 70.0% - ---
C 50.0% -a Parallel
40.0%I 30.0% a Perpendictilar
' 200% a Random
1 10.0%
3 6 12 1s 24 30
Nurnber of Test Artides in CT
Figure 4.4. Experiment 1 results for paper objects. Figure 4.5. Experiment 1 results for liquid objects.
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Figure 4.6. Experiment 1 results for metal objects. Figure 4.7. Experiment 1 results, equal mix of objects.
Average Read Rate vs. Number of Tags (Simplified)
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Figure 4.8. Experiment 1 results show the effects of material, number of tags, and tag mounting strategy
(noted in parentheses) on the average percentage of tags that were read correctly. All results displayed in
this chart were for trials in which cargo items were loaded into the CTB such that the RFID tags were
oriented perpendicular to the bottom of the CTB.
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Experiments 2 and 3
Experiment 2 was a ground-truth baseline for the reduced-gravity Experiment 3. The chief
limitation of these experiments was the modest amount of data points that could be collected;
only 64 trials were able to be performed across the two flight days (compared to more than 350
that were performed in Experiment 1). Consequently, Experiments 2 and 3 were designed to
focus on the most important variables -material
type (of the test articles), number, and RFID tag
type. All tests were conducted in the "random" '
orientation. Still, given the limited number of
trials available, only one data point for each
unique set of variables was obtained. The other
significant difference between these experiments
(particularly Experiment 2) and Experiment I is
that, as summarized in Table 3.1, Experiments 2
and 3 were conducted with the RFID reader in
"continuous read mode" for 20 seconds and Figure 4.9. Omni-ID ProxM tag on metal can.
reporting the total number of unique tags detected
during that period, whereas for Experiment 1 the reader was in "snapshot" mode and reported
only those tags detected during a single scan of the CTB.
The "RFID tag type" variable used for these experiments merits further explanation. This
variable differs from the "tag mounting scheme" category from Experiment 1. The "tag
mounting scheme" variable in Experiment 1 examined three different mounting schemes for
attaching the Alien tags to test articles4 0 , whereas the "RFID tag type" variable in Experiments 2
and 3 refers to the use of Alien tags (with the best-performing mounting schemes from
Experiment 1) vs. Omni-ID Prox tags. It must be emphasized that the comparison was not
directly-mounted Alien tags vs. directly-mounted Omni tags, but rather Alien tags mounted on
plastic bags for tissue (scheme shown in Figure 4.3) and on foam and plastic bags for metals and
liquids (scheme shown in Figure 4.1) vs. Omni tags that were directly mounted upon the test
articles (Figure 4.9). The choice to use the best-performing Alien tag mounting scheme for
Experiments 2 and 3 was made because the primary goal of these experiments was to
characterize the effects of reduced gravity on system performance. Therefore, all non-essential
performance-drags (such as directly mounting the Alien tags to metal test articles, which resulted
in zero reads in Experiment 1, as shown in Figure 4.8), were eliminated to the extent possible.
By comparison, the Omni tags were not available to the team during Experiment 1, and so no
optimum mounting scheme had been developed for them; additionally, the manufacturer's
website claimed that the tags were "ideal for inventory control or location monitoring for high-
value metal or liquid assets" and had "ultimate reliability and accuracy on any material in any
environment" [37]. If these claims were accurate, the team wanted to demonstrate them with the
RAMSES system; the tiny form-factor of the Omni tags (Figure 4.9) renders them significantly
more appealing for real-world use than any of the foam-based tag mounting schemes developed
for the Alien tests of Experiment 1.
40 The three tag mounting schemes tested were: 1) tag mounted directly on the test article, 2) tag mounted on a
plastic bag that contains the test article, and 3) tag mounted on a piece of foam attached to a plastic bag that contains
the test article.
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The results of Experiments 2 and 3, including comparisons to Experiment 141, are detailed in
Figures 4.10-4.13. In general, it can be seen that, for the same type of tag and material, the
RAMSES system performs no worse - and often performs better - in reduced gravity than it does
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Figure 4.10. Metal objects, effect of reduced gravity.
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Figure 4.11. Paper objects, effect of reduced gravity
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Figure 4.12. Liquid objects, effect of reduced gravity.
4 Experiment I results in Figures 10-13 are labeled "Alien (1g, snapshot,
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in 1g. Figures 4.10 and 4.11
particularly illustrate this; in both, the
trials with Alien tags in reduced gravity
always yielded at least as high a read
rate as the Alien tags in 1 g, and the
same for the Omni tags. The results in
Figure 4.12, from the trials for liquid
objects, are a bit more mixed; while the
Omni tags were always better in
reduced gravity than in 1g, the Alien
tags at low concentrations actually
tested better in 1g. However, given the
sharp reversal and divergence of this
pattern at the higher concentrations (24
and 30 test articles in the CTB), as well
as the general trend seen across all
reduced gravity tests, it seems likely
that this low-concentration result is
attributable to fluctuations in system
performance over a very small sample
size. Figure 4.13, showing the results
for the tests using an equal mix of each
type of material (ie, 6 items = 2 metal,
2 liquid, and 2 paper), illustrates results
similar to those of Figure 4.12. Again,
there is a clear and consistent
divergence in the performance of the
Omni tags, with the reduced gravity
tests always out-performing the Ig
equivalents. Also, while there are
mixed results for the Alien tags at low
concentrations (of test articles in the
CTB), as the number of items increase
beyond 30 there is a clear and lasting
divergence, where the tests conducted
in reduced gravity always read a higher
percentage of the tags than the
corresponding tests in 1g.
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Figure 4.13. Equal mix of objects, effect of reduced gravity.
It bears repeating that the data points shown in Figures 4.10-4.13, for Experiments 2 and 3, each
represent a single test. Again, this lack of repetition was due to the very limited number of tests
that could be conducted in reduced gravity conditions. In the team's opinion, the experiments
that were conducted represented the best compromise between breadth of variables examined
and reliability of results. Establishing qualitative trends across the key variables, such as were
described above, was deemed a more valuable use of the limited reduced gravity tests than
collecting a limited number (2-4) of repeated points for a reduced set of variables.
CONCLUSION
These experiments revealed several important characteristics of the performance of the
RAMSES Cargo Transfer Bag prototype. A number of these characteristics are relevant for any
potential implementations of a next-generation RAMSES system on the International Space
Station, within the Constellation Program, or even here on Earth. First, read rates of 100% for at
least 30 metallic objects42 were obtained in reduced gravity conditions using the RAMSES
system and commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) tags (Omni-ID ProxTM) with a small form-factor.
This is an important milestone for any potential NASA implementation, as metallic cargo items -
such as many spare parts - are quite common in human spaceflight environments. A Gen II
passive tag with a small form factor, that is effective on metallic objects, is a key requirement.
Secondly, these experiments demonstrated that at least one Gen II COTS passive tag, the Alien
Squiggle*, could achieve read rates of 96% or greater in reduced gravity conditions in the
RAMSES prototype when mounted on paper (ie, non-metallic and non-liquid) objects. Such
non-metallic / non-liquid items represent perhaps the greatest percentage of cargo items that
NASA would like to tag and track with RFID in the immediate future.
Such results reinforce the conclusions established in Chapter 3. The finding of that chapter was
that a narrow, targeted implementation of the RAMSES system would very likely generate a
significant positive return-on-investment for NASA. The read rate accuracy of the RAMSES
42 At least for those metallic objects tested here, empty aluminum soda cans.
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system was one of the key uncertain input parameters that went into that calculation, and we see
now that the values used in the calculation were quite conservative. In the Monte Carlo
simulations, the system accuracy value was allowed to range between 80% and 100%,43 but as
just demonstrated, in a realistic environment RAMSES can actually achieve read rate accuracies
of 100% for metal and at least 96% and 93% for paper and liquid objects, respectively.
Therefore, the true probability of the system generating a significant positive return-on-
investment is perhaps even greater than outlined in Chapter 3.
43 For the Monte Carlo scenarios which varied the inputs assuming a normal distribution of each input, the system
accuracy variable was set to mean = 90% and standard deviation = 5%. Therefore, a 95% system accuracy value
would fall in the upper quartile of that range. See Tables C.7 and C.8, in Appendix C, for complete details.
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CHAPTER 5: IMPORTANT FACTORS FOR SUCCESSFUL INFUSION OF SMALL-BUSINESS
(SBIR/STTR) TECHNOLOGY INTO NASA'S MAINSTREAM INNOVATION SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 2, we learned about NASA's current asset tracking system for the International Space
Station. In Chapters 3 and 4, we examined the financial and technical performance of the
RAMSES system, an RFID-based solution that proposes to automate a significant portion of the
ISS inventory management process. This technology, funded largely via NASA's Small
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) / Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program,
appears to have significant merit.
However, at least one serious challenge remains. RAMSES must cross the so-called "valley of
death" [15] for new technologies, and make the transition from the end of its STTR Phase II
contract to infusion into the mainstream NASA innovation system. This chapter compares
RAMSES and several other SBIR/STTR projects in an initial attempt to better understand how
SBIR/STTR projects are or are not infused at NASA. Particular attention will be paid to
identifying those informal processes and non-technical characteristics which may be common to
successfully-infused projects.
DATA COLLECTION
Six case studies of SBIR/STTR projects are described in this chapter. Of these six, two of the
projects (Cases B and C) are from a single company, while the other four are each from a
different company. Companies were asked to participate via an open invitation emailed to a
consortium of New England-area small-business technology firms. Interviews were arranged
with every company with NASA SBIR/STTR experience that responded. At each company,
interviews were conducted with at least one senior manager and at least one senior member of
the technical staff with SBIR/STTR experience.
In addition to these company-based case studies, 22 interviews were conducted with NASA
engineers and managers at three field centers (Goddard, JPL, and JSC) and Headquarters. These
interviews were part of a larger research effort to understand NASA's macro-level innovation
architecture, and the processes and programs by which an idea is developed and perhaps
eventually incorporated into a flight project. COTRs (Contracting Officer's Technical
Representative) and technologists, SBIR/STTR program staff, and technology development
leadership were interviewed at the theme, center, mission directorate, and agency levels.
All interviews in this effort were of a semi-structured format. In the interviews of SBIR/STTR
company employees and NASA COTRs and technologists, the initial question for each interview
subject was to describe a "successful" SBIR/STTR project that s/he had worked on, as well as an
"unsuccessful" such project.44 As the interview progressed, follow-up questions were asked as
44 The definition of "successful" and "unsuccessful" was initially left to the discretion of the interview subject. If
requested, however, the interviewer defined "successful" as the project's final product having been "infused" or
"taken up" by NASA. It is important to note that not all interview subjects were able to give examples of each.
( 57
necessary (and as time allowed) in several key areas to supplement the initial description of the
project provided by the interview subject. These follow-up questions examined the technology
of the project, the characteristics of the company's project team, the characteristics of the NASA
COTR (Contracting Officer's Technical Representative), the characteristics of the company
itself, the nature of the communication between the company team and NASA, the internal
dynamics of NASA itself at the time, and the origin of the project idea and proposal.
For the foundational case, Case A, interviews were conducted with both the small business team
and the NASA COTR. The other five cases were based upon interviews with either the company
or the NASA COTR; the missing side could not be reached in time for inclusion in this effort.
The six cases contained in this work were not chosen to be representative of the many kinds of
SBIR/STTR companies and projects, but rather as an initial dataset to identify potential factors
which later work could examine in greater detail.
METHODOLOGY
The six case studies to be described in this paper will be examined across several intervals of the
SBIR/STTR lifecycle. The lifecycle is divided as shown in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1. SBIR/STTR Project Lifecycle
In Figure 5.1, the various stages of an SBIR/STTR project are split into six different segments:
1) Initial brainstorming. (How did the company come up with the idea for the proposal?)
2) Experience of SBIRISTTR Phase I.
3) Transition from Phase I to Phase II.
4) Experience of SBIR/STTR Phase II.
5) Post-Phase II funding from NASA.
6) Infusion into NASA flight project.
Most SBIR/STTR projects will not survive to see all six stages, but many that are proven to be
technically feasible will proceed to the end of Stage 4. After Stage 4, there is no longer any
Congressionally-mandated funding (indicated by the dotted box) set aside for the SBIR/STTR
programs. One of the key questions to be answered is how a technically-successful project is
able to make the leap from Stage 4 to Stages 5 & 6.
DATA
SBIR/STTR Projects - Case A
Case A is the first and most comprehensive of the six SBIR/STTR projects that will be described
in this paper. Case A is unique among the six because it is the only one to both attract Post-
58 J
_1W
-- ------ - ----
SBIR Phase II funding (Stage 5 in Figure 5.1) and be chosen for a current flight-project (Stage
6). Furthermore, for Case A, key players from both the small business and NASA were
interviewed.
The story of Case A begins with failure. Company A is a very small business (less than 10 full-
time employees) that was spun out from a larger corporation in the early part of this decade to
focus exclusively on a specific technology. When the commercial market for this technology
started to tighten up, the company reluctantly 45 turned to the SBIR program to supplement its
other business. The company had early success with the DOD SBIR program, winning several
Phase I awards and every Phase II which they applied for. However, this same success did not
translate to its proposals to NASA; during this same time period, the company submitted three
"blind"46 proposals to NASA for Phase I SBIRs, and all three were rejected.
For roughly 15 years prior to this, a certain NASA technologist and several government
colleagues had been working on this technology for space-based remote sensing applications.
The technologist's efforts were initially funded by a $50,000 award from his Center's "Director's
Discretionary Fund" (DDF), and then ramped up substantially by two subsequent grants (each 3
years in duration) from the relevant theme technology office in NASA's Science Mission
Directorate.
Then, by coincidence, the CEO of Company A and this key NASA technologist met while both
were attending a technical review meeting for the particular technology in question. The CEO
and the NASA technologist talked about their work on this technology, and the technologist
encouraged the CEO to submit another Phase I proposal to NASA. As it happened, the relevant
NASA Phase I SBIR sub-topic manager was a colleague of the technologist and worked just
down the hall, so the technologist told the sub-topic manager to expect the proposal and
requested the opportunity to help review it. When the proposal came in, the technologist and his
colleague were very pleased with its quality, and recommended it for SBIR funding. The
technologist also volunteered to serve as the COTR (Contracting Officer's Technical
Representative, the key NASA point-of-contact and technical advisor for the contract - an
unfunded responsibility) if the project were to be receive an SBIR award. (All of this occurred in
what is denoted "Stage 1" of Figure 5.1, above.)
The project was indeed chosen for a Phase I SBIR award, and the technologist was appointed the
COTR. Company A performed very well throughout Phase I (Stage 2 of Figure 5.1). The
company and technologist communicated regularly over the duration of the six-month contract,
and the company thoroughly impressed the technologist by delivering working hardware by the
end of the contract.47
Company A then submitted a proposal (Stage 3 in Figure 5.1) for a SBIR Phase II award. The
technologist strongly supported this proposal, and recommended it for funding. Much to his
4 The company was reluctant to do business with the government because it did not want to deal with the changes to
its accounting system required by government cost-plus-fee contracts. It vastly preferred firm-fixed contracts.
46 A "blind" proposal is defined as one that was submitted without any prior consultation (pre-solicitation release)
with interested NASA parties.
4 Typically a Phase I contract is simply a "feasibility study" which results in little or no hardware.
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surprise, however, the proposal was not funded. The technologist vigorously protested to the
relevant NASA SBIR theme office, which happened to be located at his Center at the time. The
technologist felt that Company A deserved such advocacy given the outstanding work which
they had done during Phase I, and he felt that the technology held significant potential for NASA
applications related to his own efforts. The technologist convinced the relevant SBIR program
official that it was a mistake to reject Company A's Phase II proposal, and the official was
motivated enough to dig up some SBIR money that had gone unclaimed in order to continue the
project for 18 months. Roughly simultaneous to this protest, the NASA technologist also
submitted a proposal to his Center's IRAD (Internal Research and Development) fund, but this
proposal was not successful.
Nevertheless, the cobbled-together SBIR funding kept the project going, and as it continued to
progress, an opportunity for true infusion began to develop. About this time, technical
difficulties arose in the construction of a satellite of critical national importance. The NASA
technologist working with Company A felt that the company's technology could help this
mission overcome its challenges.
As the 18 months of quasi-Phase II funding came to an end, the NASA technologist again
applied for IRAD funding to keep the work going, and this time he was successful. Thus, the
project reached Stage 5 on the lifecycle diagram of Figure 5.1. Simultaneously, the technologist
had also been talking with the flight project mentioned above, and finally convinced them to
adopt Company A's technology. 48 Consequently, after only a few months of IRAD funding, the
technology was picked up and robustly funded by the flight project (Stage 6 of Figure 5.1).
Asked to comment as to the SBIR's impact on the flight project's decision to adopt the
technology, the NASA technologist stated, "Having a commercial company building these,
actually, I think, added some level of credibility for it to be considered for a flight mission."
SBIR/STTR Projects - Case B
Case B is the first of two cases which deal with the same small business, denoted here at
Company BC. This company, for the entirety of Cases B and the majority of Case C, was a
space technology development firm with less than 15 employees. During the final year of its
Phase II work in Case C, the company was acquired by a larger aerospace-focused small
business with a few hundred employees. Before this acquisition, a majority of Company BC's
revenue came from NASA SBIR and STTR awards.
Case B bears some striking similarities to Case A. Described by the CEO of Company BC as the
'best NASA SBIR that we've done', the Case B project started with a conversation about
NASA's needs and Company BC's technological expertise and ideas. The CEO of Company BC
spent several years at NASA before his time at BC - including experience in the mission area
relevant to the eventual proposal - and the conversation was with a former colleague who had
become a manager in one of NASA's science technology development offices. During the
conversation, the CEO and the NASA manager came up with an idea for an SBIR based upon a
product that BC had previously developed. Both company and customer were excited about the
48 This task was no doubt made considerably easier by the political pressure to accomplish the particular science
objective.
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proposal, and the company subsequently proposed and won a Phase I award. Thus, again, the
brainstorming in Stage 1 successfully transitioned to Stage 2.
This Phase I SBIR was assigned to the NASA science technology office which the CEO's former
colleague managed, and this manager assigned as COTR a technologist who was "the" person at
NASA working on exactly the technical area at which the SBIR was targeted. The CEO
described this COTR as being very interested and engaged throughout the project. Never did
more than 2 weeks pass between contact. The CEO reported that this helped the team to
establish very firm and specific requirements early in the process. It also gave the company
some additional motivation, the CEO reported. He knew that the COTR was going to thoroughly
read all the reports that were generated, to the extent of calling to ask about a specific point on a
particular page if he (the COTR) didn't understand or agree with it. More importantly, the CEO
stated that what gets Company BC's team "out of bed" is the chance to "fly things in space", and
so having such clear interest from NASA was a significant motivation for them.
Phase I was very successful, and a Phase II contract was awarded. The CEO reported that his
team "cranked out a lot more than $600k" worth of work for the Phase II, due to the convergence
of factors described above. The NASA COTR and his manager were pleased with the work, and
at the end of Phase II, their office funded a "Phase III" effort4 9, equivalent to Stage 5 from Figure
5.1. For the Phase III, Company BC and their NASA counterparts flew the project on NASA's
reduced-gravity aircraft to collect data in that gravity regime. This too was successful.
However, because the relevant flight project was delayed significantly into the future, no further
work has been done with the project's results. The CEO is confident that, given the positive
results, Company BC will be a "major player" when it comes time to develop the relevant system
for the flight project. Still, given the likely 10-15 year wait, Stage 6 infusion remains an open
question.
SBIR/STTR Projects - Case C
Case C deals with another SBIR project that was conducted by Company BC. This project is an
interesting contrast with Case B, because although it builds on exactly the same previously-
developed core technology as the Case B project, a few key characteristics of the project were
different - as was the final result.
In Case C, Company BC submitted a "blind" Phase I proposal to a NASA SBIR solicitation that
looked promising. There was no prior contact between the company and any relevant
individuals at NASA. The proposal was accepted for a Phase I contract, but Company BC felt
the assigned COTR was not a good match. The company believed that the project was only
loosely related to the COTR's daily responsibilities, and that he did not seem to be intellectually
interested in the technology that Company BC was developing. Furthermore, at the time, NASA
was still defining its own relevant plans in the technology area of the SBIR proposal. Thus, the
company found it very difficult to formulate fixed requirements in a timely fashion, and felt very
much on its own. The CEO felt that the COTR's view was that Company BC could do whatever
it wanted; the CEO believed that the COTR did not have strong input or feelings about the end
49 A "Phase 111" award refers to a contract which an SBIR-funding agency can award as a follow-on to a Phase 11,
and which is exempt from the normal full and open competition requirements of the Federal Acquisition
Regulations.
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results generated by the SBIR work. Also, the CEO noted that his team began to write the bare
minimum for the required status reports, because unlike in Case B, they saw no evidence that this
COTR was carefully reading nor interested in the reports.
Company BC was able to win a Phase II award for the project, but problems continued.
Eventually, due to technical troubles and a continued lack of engagement from any customer, the
CEO down-scoped the project in order to prevent Company BC from taking a loss on the
endeavor.
SBIR/STTR Projects - Case D
Case D illustrates the importance of maintaining technical continuity and buy-in for a particular
project on the small business side of a project. The project was conducted by Company D, a firm
of approximately 15 people that is focused on the development of the specific technology of
Case D.
Stage 1 of Case D proceeded much the same as with Cases A and B. The key technical person
for Company D met a relevant NASA technologist through prior relationships with the
technologist's colleagues. This technical person and his company had done several previous
SBIRs related to the technology in question, and he and the NASA technologist brainstormed
some SBIR ideas based on the technologist's/NASA's needs and the company's interests and
capabilities. The NASA technologist described his role as describing NASA's needs to the
Company D representative, reporting that he told the representative, "If it did this, we could
really use it, and here's the real application for it, so you gotta worry about this, this, this, and
this. So I did not tell them how to build it or anything like that, it was more like a [...] what do
we want to do with it, and what does it have to be able to do for us to really use it." In the end,
the two came up with a project that would combine, in a new way useful to NASA, several
different things that the company had previously developed.
When Company D's Phase I SBIR proposal was accepted, the NASA technologist volunteered to
serve as the COTR. He was keenly interested in the project, which was very relevant to his
NASA responsibilities. As he explained, what the company had proposed to do was something
that his NASA lab did not have the capability - nor the funding - to do: "We [were] definitely
leveraging their ability." Furthermore, he noted, "we [NASA] want to be able to buy these later
anyway."
The Phase I SBIR went well, and the NASA technologist endorsed the company's proposal for a
Phase II contract. This was awarded, and the technologist reported that things proceeded well
until the key Company D employee, who had been working on the project originally, took a job
somewhere else. After that, the technologist reported that he didn't hear from the company very
often, and that they did not meet his expectations for finishing the Phase II. The NASA
technologist reported that he had not seen a Phase III proposal from the company, and would
probably not recommend them for such a proposal if it were to be forthcoming.
SBIR/STTR Projects - Case E
In Case E, we briefly explore another example of a project with some promise which was
doomed by problems on the company side. This project was proposed by Company E, a brand-
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new start-up company that included only a few employees. Furthermore, when this company
started work on the Phase I contract, the company was not particularly close to being able to
fabricate anything.
Still, the Phase I proposal was awarded, and the same NASA technologist as for Case D was
tapped to serve as COTR. According to the technologist, this company did some good work
early in Phase I, but then proceeded to "self-destruct". The Phase I project was not completed,
and no Phase II was awarded or proposed. The company folded.
SBIR/STTR Projects - RAMSES
The final case study is RAMSES. This project was a Small-Business Technology Transfer
(STTR) partnership between Aurora Flight Sciences (formerly Payload Sciences, Inc.) and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This case is an interesting contrast to the first three cases
- the other cases which were not disrupted by internal company dynamics - because it shares
characteristics with both the "successes" (Cases A and B) and the "failure" (Case C). RAMSES
managed a small Stage 5 effort (August 2009) after the end of Phase II (May 2009), but has not
achieved actual infusion into NASA (Stage 6).
RAMSES was a blind proposal, with no prior relevant contact between the company and NASA,
and was accepted for a Phase I STTR.50 The NASA employee who was assigned as the COTR
for the project was the person who had written the original solicitation. The team's accepted
project was not what the COTR had originally intended, but the team reported that he willingly
engaged with the project nonetheless.
Phase I went well and a Phase II proposal was accepted. However, about this time, the NASA
COTR left the agency for a different job. Also, as Phase II began, the RAMSES team started to
narrow the focus of the project to the NASA application for which the technology seemed most
suited. This application was asset tracking and management for human spaceflight applications,
especially the International Space Station and Constellation programs. Unfortunately, this area
of application was the expertise of a different NASA Center than the one out of which the project
was managed.
The technical work proceeded well, but maintaining NASA engagement proved quite difficult.
The "replacement" COTR was not a member of the mainstream NASA technical staff. Despite
repeated attempts, the Phase II project team was unable to establish contact with the COTR until
the end of the Phase II contract, when it was time to arrange delivery of the hardware and final
report. Thus, the primary NASA customer contact that occurred during the two-year Phase II
was not with or through the COTR, but rather the project team's own network of contacts at
NASA. Through these contacts, intermittent customer outreach was achieved. Part of this
outreach included an in-depth study of the relevant NASA program by the project team, in order
to understand the customer's needs and guide the development of the prototype as well as the
business case.
5 Note that the primary difference between an SBIR and STTR is that the latter must include a University partner in
addition to the small business. The length of the Phase I award is also 12 months instead of 6, and the program may
be somewhat less competitive, but for all intents and purposes it is very similar to the SBIR program.
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The project team successfully completed the Phase II work, and through its own efforts found an
opportunity and wrote a proposal to conduct tests under a special program for a parabolic flight
campaign with NASA's Reduced Gravity Office. This proposal was successful (thus a quasi-
Stage 5 was achieved), as was the parabolic flight test campaign, and these combined results
generated moderate interest from relevant NASA technical and programmatic officials. In
October of 2009, discussions occurred with ISS Program officials regarding a potential flight
opportunity and the production of additional prototype systems. However, these discussions had
not resulted in a clear infusion opportunity as of the publication of this thesis.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SBIR/STTR CASE STUDIES
Table 5.1, on the next page, summarizes the six different cases, according to the lifecycle stages
of Figure 5.1. From Table 5.1 and the preceding discussion of the cases, three important themes
emerge with respect to successful SBIR infusion.
First, these cases seem to indicate the value of pre-proposal (Stage 1) contact between the
companies and potential NASA customers. It is important to point out that three of the six cases
studied here were Phase I proposals that were accepted with no such prior consultation;
therefore, this work does not suggest that any kind of "favoritism" exists with respect to Phase I
awards. However, it does appear that such pre-proposal contact can play a significant role in
facilitating the company's understanding of NASA's potential needs and requirements; Company
A, despite enjoying very high SBIR proposal acceptance rates with the DOD, went 0 for 3 on its
first three proposals to NASA. Furthermore, pre-proposal contact seems to promote the
matching of a project with an interested and relevant COTR. Of the six cases described in this
paper, all three (Cases A, B, and E) which featured pre-proposal contact between the company
and NASA were matched with strong COTRs, while all three which did not feature such pre-
proposal contact were matched with COTRs who the companies felt had less relevant experience
and/or less interest in the particular project. It is worth noting that the DOD explicitly
encourages such pre-proposal contact in its SBIR program5 ' [14].
Relevant to this last point, a second theme that can be noted from these cases is the importance
of a relevant, interested, and engaged COTR. In Cases A, B, and E, the companies felt that there
was good alignment between the COTR's work, experience, and interests and the particular
SBIR project. One can argue that two of these three Cases (specifically A and B) represent the
most successful projects of the six, as both were taken up by the relevant NASA organizations
for additional, post-Phase II development (Stages 5 and 6). While impossible to say with
certainty, the third, Case D, seemed to be moving in that same direction until a disruption
occurred at the project company.
51 DOD provides a post-solicitation-release period for questions and answers as well as a specific point-of-contact
for each topic, with all questions and answers posted publicly.
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Table 5.1: Comparison of six SBIR/STTR projects.
Case A Case B Case C Case D Case E RAMSES
3 blind Phase l's rejected, Brainstormed w/ NASA Brainstormed w/ NASA
Q ~~~~~~ Brainstormed w/ NASA tcnlgseeta
Stechnologist (eventual technology manager prior Blind proposal, Add-on technologist, evetual Blind proposal, no prior
Ctch oosuesful to Phase I application. to previous work. COTR, prior to Phase I Blind proposal experience with technology.CoAdd-on to previous work. application. Add-on to
Phase I application previous work.
Matched with very Matched with Matched w/ very interested Company didMatched with very interested interested and relevant uninterested and and relevant COTR, clear good work, but Project not exactly what COTR
and relevant COTR, COTR, very clear irrelevant COTR, no rt intended, but he is interested and
excellent results. requirements provided, req's provided, host reents. tat-up semi- engaged. Good results.
good results. program in flux. results. that folded.
Q Phase I denied; COTR
U appeals and wins partial Phase II awarded Phase II awarded Phase I awarded None. Phase II awarded
funding
Phase I struggles, and Good progress until key COTR leaves, is replaced by
"Phase 11" goes well, same Phase I1 goes well, team eventually de- technical person left non-technical staff member who
"Phae TR goeseproduced "much more scopes to avoid cost cmpal en left None. is busy and not in contact,
than $600k" of work overruns. COTR Wrong center for this work.
remains disengaged. off Technology works well.
COTR / TechnologySCOTR secures IRAD funds, manager provide Phase III None. None. Nrgam n
but only needed for very None. None. N/A ASA FAST program, and
short time funding for parabolic team, funds parabolic flight tests.
flight tests
Technology on shelf until Large effort by team to contacthTechnology chosen to the relevant flight project relevant people at relevant centerShelp technical ly-troubled, N/AN/NAflihtgets approved (5 to 10+ for potential Phase Ill. As of
priority project yrs) publication, no clear success.
The COTRs supported these projects in multiple ways. They provided information about
NASA's needs and requirements, they provided technical guidance and suggestions, motivation,
and when necessary they served as an internal-to-NASA advocate for the technology. The
technology developed in Case A in particular - which was eventually infused into a priority
flight project - would have been shelved with the rejection of the SBIR Phase II application if the
COTR had not intervened and persistently advocated for continued funding. Critically, the
COTRs for Cases A and B also identified and secured Stage 5 (post-SBIR Phase II) funding; and
for Case A also indentified the Stage 6 (flight-project infusion) opportunity, which Company A
could not have done on its own. This support for the post-Phase II infusion process was notably
lacking for RAMSES; if not for the RAMSES team's pre-existing set of NASA contacts, the
project would likely have been shelved from lack of internal NASA visibility at the end of Phase
II. Finally, anecdotes suggest that an active and interested COTR can also serve as a motivator
to help ensure that NASA receives maximum value from its awards. For example, the CEO of
Company BC noted that Company BC put much more effort into the reports for Case B than they
did for Case C and produced "much more than $600k" worth of work for that Phase II, simply
because they knew that the Case B NASA COTR would carefully read each report and follow-
up, whereas the Case C COTR did not.
A third theme that emerges from this work is the importance of a Stage 6 infusion opportunitv, in
order for any project to be fully integrated into the mainstream NASA technology system. In
Case A, the SBIR project was very fortunate to have a flight mission opportunity come along just
as the technology was finishing its development period. The existence of this opportunity stands
in contrast to the experiences of Case B and RAMSES, the only other projects to successfully
move into Stage 5. For Case B, the fundamental challenge to continued work is that the flight
mission for which the technology is designed will not occur for another 10-15 years. Thus, while
NASA gained valuable information for future design work from the SBIR effort, it may not be
able to leverage the expertise of the Company BC team when it comes time to actually build the
flight system. In 10 to 15 years, people at Company BC may have moved to other jobs at other
companies, and/or simply not remember many of the details of the completed work.
Of course, there must also be funding to support the final development and testing necessary for
such infusion. For RAMSES, unlike Case B, a relevant flight mission (the International Space
Station) does currently exists. Unfortunately, there seems to be very little NASA funding
available to support the final development and certification of the technology in order to fly it.
Furthermore, for these cases it also seems important that such a flight project has some incentive
for providing a flight opportunity to a new technology. Case A was fortunate that its particular
flight mission was one of national importance and had a critical need for the technology
developed in Case A. The criticality of the need appeared to be an incentive for the adoption of
the new technology. By comparison, the relevant flight mission for RAMSES does not have as
critical a need for the technology RAMSES provides, and thus is under no special pressure to
provide a flight opportunity for it.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter described the comparative analysis of six different NASA SBIR/STTR projects -
including the RAMSES project - in an attempt to identify any non-technical characteristics
and/or informal processes which might be important for successful technology infusion. Within
this set of cases, three key observations emerged. First, in all cases for which there were pre-
proposal conversations between potential companies and NASA customers, the accepted SBIR
project was subsequently well-matched to an interested and relevant NASA COTR. Second, in
these cases, an interested and relevant COTR appeared to be an important advocate, motivator
and enabler of infusion. Third, the existence of an opportunity for infusion - and the funding
and incentives to support it - was important to achieving final "spin-in" to a flight project for the
cases examined here.
These observations may explain at least some of the difficulty that the RAMSES team has
experienced when it comes to achieving NASA infusion. The RAMSES project was a blind
proposal without any pre-submission conversations between the team and NASA, and although
NASA chose to accept the proposal and fund it, the team's idea was not what the assigned COTR
had imagined when he proposed the sub-topic. Thus, the project was not well-aligned with the
daily responsibilities of the COTR or the competencies of his NASA center. This mis-alignment
was exacerbated when the original COTR left NASA after Phase I, and another NASA employee
outside the relevant technical area had to assume the role. The RAMSES team drew on its own
network of contacts at NASA in order to gain some level of insight into NASA's likely desires
and requirements for the system. However, in light of the cases examined in this chapter, the
lack of an appropriate internal "champion" from the start - who could have guided development
from Day 1, advocated for the system within NASA, and identified the funding sources required
to support final infusion - may be a significant reason that RAMSES has not yet escaped the
"valley of death" and passed into the mainstream NASA innovation system. The current budget
pressure and programmatic uncertainty in NASA's human spaceflight program is likely also a
contributing factor.
Finally, it should be noted that the questions explored in this chapter seem particularly ripe for
further study. A more comprehensive effort to study a larger number and more diverse selection
of companies and technologies could help to develop a truly comprehensive understanding of
those non-technical characteristics and informal processes which help enable infusion of
SBIR/STTR (and other) innovations at NASA.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has employed engineering, management, and social science methodologies to analyze
the prospects for the RAMSES technology development project to achieve infusion into the
mainstream NASA innovation system. As Figure 6.1 and this work illustrates, infusion is only
possible when the Technical, Financial, and Program/Policy elements of a project all come
together. The questions which this thesis developed and pursued as it investigated those
elements for RAMSES can be utilized by any other development project that wishes to determine
its prospects for infusion. Admittedly, achieving infusion is a very complex process, and neither
this nor any other analysis conducted a priori will be able to perfectly predict the final outcome.
However, a careful and holistic consideration of all three key factors - Technical, Financial and
Program/Policy - should serve as a useful guide.
Financial
Is the project likely to result inpositive
Net Present Value forNASA?
Technical
Does the technology
perform as advertised?
Program/Policy
- Was the product designed in
collaboration with NASA from Day 1?
- Is there an internalNASA champion?
e Is there an infusion opportunity?
Figure 6.1 SBIR/STTR Infusion depends upon Technical, Financial, and
Program/Policy Factors.
SUMMARY
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Aurora Flight Sciences developed RAMSES
(Rule-based analytic Asset Management for Space Exploration System) via NASA Small-
Business Technology Transfer (STTR) Phase I and Phase II contracts. RAMSES leverages
Generation II passive Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology to address the
challenges of efficient asset tracking and management in human spaceflight applications. In
particular, RAMSES aims to automate the tracking the tens of thousands of small, portable cargo
assets that are currently stored onboard the International Space Station (ISS).
Chapter 2 detailed NASA's current inventory tracking and management processes and systems
for the International Space Station Program. Maintaining an accurate record of the quantities
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and locations of the tens of thousands of assets is a significant task, scheduled to consume some
4.5 person-months of crew time every year at ISS Assembly Complete.
Chapter 3 applied this information to calculate the probabilistic Net Present Value (NPV) of the
application of RAMSES system to the International Space Station's Cargo Transfer Bags
(CTBs). Quantities such as crew time, cargo launch volume, and cargo launch mass were
monetized to allow comparison of costs and benefits, and several different implementation
scenarios were evaluated. The analysis found that the application is likely to have significant
positive value for NASA when inventory transactions are concentrated in a subset of the total
cargo transfer bag population, and/or if ISS Operations are continued into 2018/2020. It is
demonstrated that a modest concentration of inventory transactions - for example, 75% of
transactions occurring in the 50% of the bags that are RFID equipped - results in a positive mean
NPV of approximately $46.8 million, and an 84% probability of a positive NPV, even with a ISS
retirement date of 2015. A sensitivity analysis revealed that the volume, mass, and accuracy of
the RAMSES system have a significant impact upon the estimated NPV. Of course, this model
could not capture all the relevant parameters, particularly the costs for International Partner
approval and software integration, nor the benefits of improved crew safety and mission
assurance.
Given this promising financial analysis, Chapter 4 examined the technical performance of a
prototype RAMSES Cargo Transfer Bag (CTB) in both standard and reduced gravity conditions.
In addition to gravity, other experimental variables included the material of the test articles
(paper, metal, or liquid) and the number of articles within the container at one time. As predicted
by ground test results, the best read rates were observed during reduced-gravity flight, with
metals detected at 100% accuracy, paper at 96%, and water at roughly 93%, when tests were
conducted with 30 articles of the material in the "smart CTB" and optimum RFID-tagging
strategies. These results, while still at the prototype level, demonstrate that the system holds
significant potential for future flight implementation on ISS and future human spaceflight
outposts.
Finally, in Chapter 5 a comparative analysis of RAMSES and five other NASA Small-Business
Innovation Research (SBIR) / Small-Business Technology Transfer (STTR) projects was
conducted. This analysis worked to identify any non-technical characteristics and/or informal
processes that might be unique to SBIR/STTR projects that are successfully infused into the
mainstream NASA innovation system, and thus important to that transition. For the cases
studied herein, it seems that three characteristics were important: pre-proposal knowledge
exchanges between companies and NASA, strong matching of a project with a relevant NASA
COTR, and the availability of an actual infusion opportunity. (Of course, these characteristics
are only relevant if the small business executes the project and the technology proves feasible
and financially viable.) The RAMSES project lacked the first two of these characteristics, and
has yet to connect with an opportunity for final infusion.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
When the results of these three analyses - Technical, Financial, and Program/Policy - are
brought together, a clear and complete picture begins to emerge. In the case of RAMSES, the
financial models show that an ISS implementation of RAMSES would likely be worth the
required initial investment of financial resources and allocations of launch volume and mass,
particularly if ISS is extended until 2018 or 2020. The technical evaluation reveals that the
"smart CTB" prototype actually functions best in a reduced-gravity environment, and can attain
accuracy rates in excess of 93% with simulated cargo items. Therefore, the RAMSES system is
certainly a reasonable candidate for infusion into the mainstream NASA innovation system.
However, we see that a strong technical and financial case is not necessarily sufficient; if certain
other non-technical characteristics and informal processes are not also aligned, a technology can
easily fall victim to the "valley of death" and wither away on a forgotten lab bench gathering
dust. For RAMSES to avoid this fate, an infusion opportunity must be identified and/or created,
whether by a change in agency funding and/or priorities, a late-coming NASA "champion",
and/or the persistence and diligence of the project team itself.
As for NASA itself, the agency should continue to work towards ensuring that all SBIR/STTR
projects are given the support and connections necessary to enable infusion, when the technology
and small-business partner successfully meet expectations. Certainly, NASA faces tremendous
budgetary and scheduling pressure in all of its work, and is currently in a state of considerable
uncertainty regarding its future direction in human spaceflight. Nevertheless, the agency must
continue to struggle with the paradox that - particularly when technology development funding is
so scarce - NASA cannot afford to let promising ideas go to waste. Further efforts to facilitate
pre-proposal contacts, appropriate matching of projects with COTRs, and wide communication
of infusion opportunities might all serve as low-cost, high-reward initiatives in this struggle.
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APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS
Acronym Phrase or name
COTR Contracting Officer's Technical Representative
CTB Cargo Transfer Bag
CTBE Cargo Transfer Bag Equivalent
HI-UV High-Impact Uncertain Variable
IMS Inventory Management System
JSC NASA Johnson Space Center
KSC NASA Kennedy Space Center
ISS International Space Station
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NPV Net Present Value
NRC National Research Council
RFID Radio Frequency Identification
US United States
( 78
APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL FIGURES AND DIAGRAMS FROM CHAPTER 2
CTB DIMENSIONS & DRAWINGS
Table B.1 - CTB Dimensions (Hart, Internal Cargo)
CTB Approximate Size(external dimensions)
L x W x H [cm (in.)]
SEG33111836 24.8 cm x 42.5 cm x 23.5 cm
Half (1/2x) (9 .75 "x 16.75" x 9.25")
SEG33111837/838 50.2 cm x 42.5 cm x 24.8 cm
Single (1x) (19.75" x 16.75" x 9.75")
SEG33111839 50.2 cm x 42.5 cm x 50.2 cm
Double (2x) (19.75" x 16.75" x 19.75")
SEG33111840 74.9 cm x 42.5 cm x 50.2 cm
Triple (3x) (29.5" x 16.75" x 19.75")
Half CTB Single CTB
Double CTB Triple CTB
Figure B.I. NASA Cargo Transfer Bag Diagrams
(Image Credit: NASA)
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TRASH RECEPTACLES
(Image Credit: Hart, NASA; from Internal Cargo Integration Overview presentation)
Figure B.2 - EDV buckets (left) and lid (right)
(Liquid Biological Waste Container)
Figure B.3 - KTO (Solid Biological Waste
Container) Figure B.4 - Food Waste Bag
Figure B.5 - KBO-M (Common trash receptacle)
Figure B.6 - Rubber-Lined Bag
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APPENDIX C: ADDITIONAL CALCULATIONS AND RESULTS FROM CHAPTER 3.
DETAILED CALCULATIONS OF VALUE OF CREW TIME
Table C.1 - Estimated Annual ISS Operations Budget (Common Systems Operations
Cost)
ISS Ops Budget: 2009 2010-2016
US $ 2,060,200,000 $ 2,261,175,000
RSA $ 550,000,000 $ 550,000,000
JAXA $ 344,263,185 $ 377,846,475
ESA $ 223,233,159 $ 245,009,824
CSA $ 61,859,791 $ 67,894,289
Total: $ 3,239,556,136 $ 3,501,925,587
Sample Calculations:
US = $2,060,200,000 [35]
Common Systems Operations Costs = (1/. 766) * US = $2,689,556,136
JAXA (.128) *Common Systems Operations Costs $344,263,185
ESA = (.083) *Common Systems Operations Costs =$223,233,159
CSA = (023) *Common Systems Operations Costs = $61,859,791
[33]
[33]
[33]
[33]
Note:
1) Value of $550 million for RSA is an educated guess; see detailed explanation above in Limitations,
Conservative Assumptions, and Future Work, Chapter 3.
Table C.2 - Calculation of Value of Crew Time
Year: 2009 2010-2016
# Crew: 3 6
Avg. ISS Budget: $ ,239,556,135.77 $ 3,501,925,587_47
# "Active" Crew Hours in a Day: 161 16
$ 'Active' Crew Hr- $ 184,906.17 $ 99,940.80
Note:
1) "# Active Crew Hours in a Day" is per crew member.
2) See discussion regarding definition of "Active" Crew Hours in "Value" of Crew Time, Chapter 3.
DETAILED CALCULATIONS OF VALUE OF CARGO LAUNCH VOLUME AND CARGO LAUNCH
MASS
82 )
Table C.3 - Data Related to Cargo/Logistics Flights
Cost Per Mission (Variable Max Cargo Max Dry Cargo Available Dry Cost Per Cubic Meter
Recurring Cost) Capacity (kg) Mass (kg) Cargo Volume of Dry Cargo Volume
____________________(mnA3)
Shuttle MPLM $ 400,000,000 9400 9400 31 $ 12,903,225.81
Progress M1 $ 89,423,000 2230 1800 6.6 $ 13,548,939.39
ATV $ 500,000,000 7667 5500 13.8 $ 36,231,884.06
HTV $ 500,000,000 6000 5500 14 $ 35,714,285.71
Calculations:
Cost Per Cubic Meter of Dry Cargo Volume = Cost Per Mission /Available Dry Cargo Volume
Notes:
1) Assumed for Shuttle MPLM missions that all cargo capacity is located in MPLM.
2) All "Cost Per Mission" values should be regarded as rough approximations.
References:
Cost Per Mission [38].
Table C.4 - Launch Schedule and Calculation of $ / lb and $ / M3 .
Max Cargo - Shuttle MPLM [38], Progress M1 [32], ATV [39], HTV [40].
Max Dry Cargo Mass - Shuttle MPLM [38], Progress MI [32], ATV [39], HTV [38].
Available Dry Cargo Volume - Shuttle MPLM [38], Progress M1 [41], ATV [42], HTV [38].
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SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR PHASE-IN IMPLEMENTATION SCENARIO
Table C.5 - Sensitivity Analysis of Input Variables for Discrete Simulations of Phase-In Implementation
Scenario. In comparison to the sensitivities for the Mod-Kits Scenario in Table 3.8, the magnitudes of the
sensitivities here are much smaller, but the pattern of relative magnitudes remains fairly similar. The
reason for the difference in magnitudes is that, for Table 3.8, the reference NPV (NPVO) was -$+14 million,
while for the Phase-In table it was -$-65 million, and so for the Phase-In scenario for the same changes in
input variables and similar magnitude changes in output values, you get smaller % changes in output.
Number of Crew (2010+)
Avg, ISS Budget (2009-2016)
# "Aetive" Crew Hours Per Day:
RFID System Weight
Cost to Modify 1 CTB for RFID System (add pockets, insulation, install electronics):
Dis count Rate
Time Required for Astronauts to Transfer CTB Contents to new CTB (hr):
Number of CTBs Contents Transferred to Wired CTFB On-Orbit:
# of CTFBs On-Orbit that are to be wired:
Wired CTB Launch Rate (% of Total ISS Population):
% On-orbit IMS Entries that could be Automated by Wired CTBs:
% of CTB Transactions Accurately Detected by System:
Percent of Standard CTB volume required for RFID Sy stem:
Volume Cost ($ / m^3):
DETAILS OF DISCRETE SIMULATION FOR MODIFICATION KITS IMPLEMENTATION SCENARIO
Table C.6 - General Inputs (Part I).
Year:
# Crew:
Avg. ISS Budget:
# "Active" Crew Hours in a Day:
$ /'Active' Crew Hr:
RFID System Weight (lbs):
Launch Cost ($ / lb):
$ / System:
Discount Rate:
Volume of Standard CTB (m^3):
Percent of Standard CTB volume required for RFID System:
Volume Cost ($ / m^3):
$ / System: 128,717.97 1 $ 200,629.63
Note:
1) "Launch Cost ($/lb)" and "Volume Cost (S/m^3)" both have different values for Pre- and Post-Shuttle
Retirement. For convenience, these values are listed under "2009" and "2010-2016" respectively, even
though the Shuttle will not retire until the end of 2010. All calculations are performed using the correct
retirement date.
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3 6
$ 3,239,556,135.77 $ 3,501,925,587.47
16 16
$ 184,906.17 $ 99,940.80
4 4
$ 25,511.96 $ 35,715.01
$ 102,047.85 $ 142,860.02
7% 7%
0.053 0.053
12% 12%
$ 20,272,793.47 $ 31,598,719.79
2009 S2010-2016
NORMALLY-DISTRIBUTED RANDOM VARIABLES FOR MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS
Table C.7 - Randomly Generated Variables for Modification Kits Impk mentation Scenario.
Lower 95% Upper 95% Mean StdDev 2009-2010 2011-2016
______________________ Bound Bound _____________________
Avg. Total ISS Budget: $3,100,000,000 $3,650,000,000 $3,375,000,000 $ 137,500,000 $ 3,168,583,748 $ 3,365,681,107
# "Active" Crew Hours in a Day: 10 18 14 2 12
% On-orbit IMS Entries that could be 30% 70% 50% 10% 45%
Automated by Wired CTBs:
% of CTB Transactions Accurately 80% 100% 90% 5% 92%
Detected by System:
$ / m^13 of Cargo Up-Volume: $ 10,000,000 $50,000,000 $ 30,000,000 $ 10,000,000 $ 35,979,362 $ 28,675,797
Percent of Standard CTB volume 4% 20% 12% 4% 8%
required for RFID System: 1 4% 20% 12% 4%_8%
Table C.8 - Randomly Generatd Variables for Phase-In Implementation Scenario.
Lower 95% Upper 95% Mean Std Dev 2009-2010 2011-2016
______________________ Bound Bound ______ _____
Avg. Total ISS Budget: $3,100,000,000 $3,650,000000 $3,375,000,000 $137,500,000 $3,188,222,430 $3,524,480,947
# "Active" Crew Hours in a Day: 10 18 14 2 13
% On-orbit IMS Entries that could be 30% 70% 50% 10% 48%
Automated by Wired CTBs:
% of CTB Transactions Accurately 80% 100% 90% 5% %%
Detected by System:
$/ m^ 3 of Cargo Up-Volume: $ 10,000,000 $50,000,000 $ 30,000,000 $S,00,0 39,046,734 $ 41,051,962
Percent of Standard CTB volume required 4% 20% 12.0% 4.0% 14%
for RFID System:
Wired CTB Launch Rate (% of Total ISS 5% 15% 10.0% 2.5% 11%
Population): 5 I5%
Sample Calculation:
(From Table C.7, using Microsoft Excel 2007 functions)
2009-2010 Random Value for "# Active Crew Hours in a Day
INT(NORMINV(R ANDO, Mean 4Active, Std Dev Av,)) = 12
[43]
Note:
1) The appropriate General Input variables are set equal to the randomly-generated variables (Columns "2009-
2010" and "2011-2016"), and an Excel Data Table is used to create the 3500 point simulation. This
calculates the net present value using 3500 combinations of the randomly-generated variables.
2) A variable does not have a value listed under "2011-2016" if the "2009-2010" variable is used for both
time periods.
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UNIFORMLY-DISTRIBUTED RANDOM VARIABLES FOR MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS
Table C.9 - Uniformly-Generated Variables for Modification Kits Implementation Scenario.
Lower Bound Upper Bound 2009-2010 2011-2016
Avg. Total ISS Budget: $ 3,100,000,000 S 3,650,000,000 $ 3,145,265,355 $ 3,363,132,171
# "Active" Crew Hours in a Day: 10 18 10
% On-orbit IMS Entries that could be Automated by Wired CTBs: 30% 70% 41%
% of CTB Transactions Accurately Detected by System: 80% 100% 97%
$ / m^3 of Cargo Up-Volume: $ 10,000,000 $50,000,000 $ 11,549,377 $ 49,555,001
Percent of Standard CTB volume required for RFID System: 4% 20% 4%
Table C.10 - Uniformly-Generated Variables for Phase-In Implementation Scenario.
Lower Bound Upper Bound 2009-2010 2011-216
Avg. Total ISS Budget: $ 3,100,000,000 $ 3,650,000,000 $ 3,357,339,623 $ 3,490,240,955
# "Active" Crew Hours in a Day: 10 18 13
% On-orbit IMS Entries that could be Automated by Wired CTBs: 30% 70% 50%
% of CTB Transactions Accurately Detected by System: 80% 100% 85%
$ / m^3 of Cargo Up-Volume: $ 10,000,000 $50,000,000 $ 15,565,849 $ 43,202,514
Percent of Standard CTB volume required for RFID System: 4% 20% 13%
Wired CTB Launch Rate (% of Total ISS Population): 5% 15% 6%
Sample Calculation:
(From Table C.9, using Microsoft Excel 2007 functions) [44]
2009-2010 Random Value for "# Active Crew Hours in a Day" =
INT(RANDO *(Upper Bound Aucaye - Lower Bound, Aciye)+Lower Bound#AcIe,) = 10
Note:
1) The appropriate General Input variables are set equal to the randomly-generated variables (Columns "2009-
2010" and "2011-2016"), and an Excel Data Table is used to create the 3500 point simulation. This
calculates the net present value using 3500 combinations of the randomly-generated variables.
2) A variable does not have a value listed under "2011-2016" if the "2009-2010" variable is used for both time
periods.
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APPENDIX D: ADDITIONAL RESULTS FROM CHAPTER 4
ADDITIONAL RESULTS FROM EXPERIMENT 1 - GROUND TESTS IN STANDARD LABORATORY
CONDITIONS
Average Read Rate vs. Number of Tags
70.0%
40.0%
50 0%
20.0%
10 0%
-4- Paper Paraki (bags, no foam)
-*- Paper Perptndicuar (bap no foam)
-*- Paper Random (bags, no 'oam)
-M- Liqu dsParlilel (bags + foam)
-#- Liqu dsPerpendckular (bags t foam)
-*-LiqudsRandom bags+fbun)
-i- Metals Parallel (bags + foam)
- Metals Perpendicula (bags +foam)
-- Met*sf nndom (bags I foam)
+ Equal Mix (all 3) Parallel
-+-" Equal Mix (all 3) Perpendicular
- Equal Mix (aIl 3) Random
Paper Perpendieu ar (bags+ foan)
- - -LiqudsPerpendicular (begs, no *oam)
LiqudsPerpendicular(nc bags orfoam)
Metals Pe rpendicula (begs, no foam)
Metals Perpendicular (no bags cr foan'
95%ftead Rate
I Number of Tgs
Figure D. I - Complete dataset from Experiment 1, showing results from all scenarios tested. One can clearly see
that the metal and liquid test articles suffered significant drop-off in read rates when the Alien tag was not
"insulated" from the articles via a foam cutout (case with insulation shown in Figure 3.3). Also, one notices that the
random-orientation cases seem to perform best, all other factors equal.
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Figure D.2 - Illustration of standard deviation, as calculated for each case shown in Figure D.I.
Table D.A - Results of all individual trials for Paper, nominal mounting scheme (tags on plastic bags without foam.)
Test Case A (Paper, Parallel, in Bags)
# of Tags in CTB Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 TriTrial rial 5 Mean Std Dev Avg. Absolute Error Ave. % Error Avg. Read Rate
6 6 6 6 6 6 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.0% 100.0%
12 12 12 12 12 12 12.00 0.00 0.00 0.0% 100.0%
18 18 17 18 18 18 17.80 0.40 0.20 1.1% 98.9%
24 23 21 22 24 24 22.80 1.17 1.20 5.0% 95.0%
30 28 26 25 22 26 25.40 1.96 4.60 15.3% 84.7%
Test Case B (Paper. Perp in Bags
# of Tags in CTB Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial Trial 4 Trial 5 Mean Std Dev Avg. Absolute Error Avg. % Error Ave. Read Rate
6 6 6 6 6 6 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.0% 100.0%
12 12 12 12 12 12 12.00 0.00 0.00 0.0% 100.0%
18 18 18 17 18 18 17.80 0.40 0.20 1.1% 98.9%
24 22 20 21 20 18 20.20 1.33 3.80 15.8% 84.2%
30 24 25 24 25 23 24.20 0.75 5.80 19.3% 80.7%
Test Case C (PaD r. Rando. in Baas! 
_________
# of Tags in CTB Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial4 Trial 5 Mean Std Dev Avg. Absolute Error Avg. % Error Avg. Read Rate
6 6 6 6 6 6 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.0% 100.W/
12 12 12 12 12 12 12.00 0.00 0.00 0.0% 100.W/
18 18 18 18 17 18 17.80 0.40 0.20 1.1% 98.9%
24 22 23 23 22 23 22.60 0.49 1.40 5.8% 94.2%
30 29 26 29 27 23 26.80 2.23 3.20 10.7% 89.3%
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Table D.2 - Results of all individual trials for Liquids, nominal mounting scheme (tags on foam on plastic bags.)
Test Case D (i . ParaeL Foam + Bogs)
# of TIa in CT i Trial2 Tial3 Tial rial5 Mean Std Dev AgAbsolute E Avg. %.mE AVL Read
6 6 6 6 6 6 6.W 000 0.00 0.0% 100.0%
12 11 10 12 12 12 11.40 0.80 0.60 5.0% 95.0%
18 8 14 16 13 15 13.20 2.79 4.80 26.7% 73.3%
24 12 18 17 16 17 16.00 2.10 8.0 333% 66.7%
30 21 16 11 17 14 15.80 3.31 14.20 47.3% 52.7%
STest~~~~~~~r Case E LA _ _ __ ____ _ _ _
# Of Tagn CTB ial1 Trial2 Tral3 Tia 4 Tral Mean Sid Dev Av .Absolute Erro Ave. % Erro Ag. Read Rate
6 5 6 5 6 5 5.40 0.49 0.60 10.0% 90.0%
12 10 11 11 11 9 10.40 0.80 1.60 13.3% 86.7%
18 13 12 12 14 13 12.80 0.75 5.20 28.9% 71.1%
24 18 17 11 17 17 16.00 2.53 8.00 33.3% 66.7%
30 16 13 23 17 16 17.00 3.29 13.00 43.3% 56.7%
Test C e Fliaii& .E m L +iRi * :_ _ _
# of Iag in CB Trial Trial 2 Tdal3 Trial Trial 5 Mean Std Dev Ang.Absoiute gE Avg,. % Er AgReadjRae
6 6 6 6 6 5 5.0 0.40 0.20 3.3% 96.7%
12 11 11 11 9 11 10.60 0.80 1.40 11.7% 88.3%
18 15 13 16 13 14 14.20 1.17 3.80 21.1% 78.9%
24 19 18 18 18 17 18.0 0.63 6.00 25.0% 75.0%
30 15 20 17 20 19 18.20 1.94 11.30 39.3% 60.7%
Table D.3 - Results of all individual trials for Metals, nominal mounting scheme (tags on foam on plastic bags.)
Test Case G tMgs arflL +B
# of Tags in CTB Trial Tria lr Trial riaL5 Mean Std Dev Ave. Absolute Error AvE % r .Read e
6 6 6 6 5 6 5.80 0.40 0.20 3.3% 96.7%
12 12 12 10 11 11 11.20 0.75 0.80 6.7% 93.3%
18 16 18 17 15 14 16.00 1.41 2.00 11.1% 88.9%
24 22 13 22 23 16 19.20 3.97 4.80 20.0% 80.0%
30 22 17 23 22 29 22.60 3.83 7.40 24.7% 75.3%
Test CMs [I Meta4h. Perp. + ____
# of Ta n CTB Tdal Tal 2 raL3 Trial IaL Mean Std Dev Ave, Abjlute Erro Avg.%Ero Ag.Readja
6 6 6 6 6 5 5.80 0.40 0.20 3.3% 96.7%
12 12 11 13 8 11 11.00 1.67 1.40 11.7% 88.3%
18 10 16 14 16 18 14.80 2.71 3.20 17.8% 82.2%
24 15 23 19 20 16 18.60 2.87 5.40 22.5% 77.5%
30 23 24 24 18 27 23.20 2.93 6.80 22.7% 77.3%
# of ags in C Tril Ta2 T rial Tral Tial 5 Mean Std Dev Avg. Absolute Error Ayg.% Error AmgReadRat
6 6 6 6 6 6 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.0% 100.0%
12 12 12 12 12 12 12.00 0.00 0. 0.0% 100.0%
18 16 18 15 17 17 16.60 1.02 1.40 7.8% 92.2%
24 22 21 23 23 18 21.40 1.85 2.60 10.8% 89.2%
30 26 29 28 20 26 25.80 3.12 4.20 14.0% 86.0%
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Table D.4 - Results of all individual trials for Equal Mix of test articles (X paper, X liquid, X metals), nominal
mounting scheme for each (tags on foam on plastic bags for liquids and metals, tags on plastic bags without foam for
paper.)
Test Case J (Equal Mix, Parallel, Foam + Bags for Metal & Lad. Baas for Paper)
# of Tags in CTB Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Mean Std Dev AvE. Absolute Error Avg. % Error Avg. Read Rate
6 6 6 6 5 6 5.80 0.40 0.20 3.3% 96.7%
12 12 12 11 11 11 11.40 0.49 0.60 5.0% 95.0
18 18 16 17 14 14 15.80 1.60 2.20 12.2% 87.8%
24 21 22 18 18 22 20,20 1.83 3.80 15.8% 84.2%
30 20 25 20 17 20 20.40 2.58 9.60 32.0% 68.0%
Test Case K (Equal Mix, Per, Foam + Boos for Metal & Lqd, Baqs for Paper_
# of Tags in CTB Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Mean Std Dev Avg. Absolute Error Avg. % Error Avg. Read Rate
6 6 6 6 6 6 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.0% 100.0%
12 12 12 11 12 9 11.20 1.17 0.80 6.7% 93.3%
18 16 10 12 16 14 13.60 2.33 4.40 24.4% 75.6%
24 20 20 21 23 21 21.00 1.10 3.00 12.5% 87.5%
30 27 15 19 21 25 21.40 4.27 8.60 28.7% 71.3%
Test Case L (Equal Mix, Random, Foam + Bags for Metal & Lqd, Bags for Paper_
of Tags in CTB Trial1 Irial2 Trial 3 5ia Ii @U Mean Std De Ave. Absolute Error Ave. % Error Avg. Read Rate
6 6 6 6 6 6 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.0% 100.0%
12 12 12 12 12 12 12.00 0.00 0.00 0.0% 100.0%
18 18 18 17 14 18 17.00 1.55 1.00 5.6% 94.4%
24 22 20 22 21 17 20.40 1.85 3.60 15.0% 85.0%
30 19 21 24 18 22 20.80 2.14 9.20 30.7% 69.3%
90
Table D.5 - Results of off-nominal mounting schemes for liquid and metallic objects.
Test Case 0 LQukTpg~osiILeD
#of Ias in CTB Trial 1Tial2 TiaL ial 4 riaL 5 Mean Std D Ag ute Avg.% ErroAvgRadj
6 2 3 1 0 2 1.60 1.02 4.40 73.3% 26.7%
12 3 2 6 4 2 3.40 1.50 8.60 71.7% 28.3%
i8 2 4 2 5 2 3.W 1.26 15.W 83.3% 16.7%
24 2 3 3 4 2 2.80 0.75 21.20 88.3% 11.7%
30 3 4 3 5 7 4.40 1.50 25.60 85.3% 14.7%
TEAt CMs P (La auk WJN___
# Of TasIn CTB TIdal- 1 Mrall2 Trial 3 Trial4 Trial 5 Mean Rtd DvAyg. Absolute fr Amg. %ErEo AngdRead.Rate
6 2 3 6 6 2 3.80 183 2.20 36.7% 63.3%
12 6 5 4 7 4 5.20 1.17 6.80 56.7% 43.3%
18 6 4 5 6 5 5.20 0.75 12.80 71.1% 28.9%
24 6 7 9 3 6 6.20 1.94 17.80 74.2% 25.8%
30 9 5 7 11 9 8.20 204 21.80 72.7% 27.3%
Test ase a Mts aa rc on cans. erd
#ofTaInCTB TiaLl daL 2 ial3 Trial 4 Trial Mean Std De Avg. Absolute Error Ave. % E Av..eadJRae
6 0 0 0 0 0 0.W 0.00 6.00 1.0% 0.0%
12 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.W 12.00 1W.0% 0.0%
24 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 o00 24.00 100.0% 0.0%
24 0 0 0 0 0 o0. 0.0 24.00 10.0% 0.0%
30 0 0 0 0 0 0.W 0 30.00 10.0% 0.0%
Test Case R IMet s ir.Wthout T .nerp_
# of Tgs in CT 11 Trial Tal Trial Ta Trial5 Mean Std Dev Ayg. AbsoluteEro Avg. % Error Ayg..Read.Bate
6 5 4 5 3 4 4.20 075 1.80 30.0% 70.0%
12 10 8 7 4 7 7.20 1.94 4.80 40.0% 60.0%
18 14 9 13 16 9 12.20 2.79 5.80 32.2% 67.8%
24 16 15 16 9 8 12.80 3.54 11.20 46.7% 53.3%
30 12 19 18 9 10 13.60 4.13 16.40 54.7% 45.3%
Table D.6 - Results of intensive orientation tests for Paper test articles, with tags mounted in the nominal
configuration for paper (on plastic bags). Each row consists of 10 individual "snapshot" reads of the exact same
configuration and orientation of test articles (24) within the container. For example, the "Unstress Parallel Repeat
(10)" row consists of 10 trials of the same "easy" parallel configuration, where all tags were orientated downwards
toward the reader in the floor of the CTB, and no two tags were directly touching one another. Similarly, in the
"stress" cases, tags were oriented as much as possible away from the readers and touching other tags, with test
articles positioned between the tags and as many readers as possible.
Unstress Parallel Repeat (10)
Stress Parallel Repeat (10)
Unstress Perp Repeat (10)
Stress Perp Repeat (10)
Random Repeat (10)
Sbtras Test CMW et~e.a s-an.a~uait omcts'1ti
Sof Ia= inR Irial Idd2 IiaL riA IsaL hIa Ida2 I d INA n Std De AYEA lut Error AMli.Eorm Au.kama
24 21 22 21 24 23 19 23 24 21 22 22M 148 2.00 &3% 91.7%
24 21 22 23 23 22 23 21 22 19 22 2180 1.17 220 9.2% 90L8%
24 19 18 20 18 19 22 20 23 22 21 2LI20 166 3.8 158% 84.2%
24 14 20 15 20 19 12 21 14 16 19 1700 3.00 71 292% 70.8%
24 23 20 22 23 223 3 24 23 24 23 22.90 1.14 110 4.6% 95.4%
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Paper (in bags)
M Unstress, Parallel100.0% Repeat(10)
80.0% I Parallel
60.0% E Stress Parallel Repeat
40.0% (10)SUnstress Perp Repeat
20.0% (10)
0.0% U Perpendicular
24
Figure D.3 - Shows the average read rates for the tests listed in Table D.6.
Figure D.4 - Shows the average read rates for tests listed in Table D.6 as well as the nominal tests for that material
from Test Case A of Table D. 1.
Table D.7 - Similar to Table D.6, shows results of intensive orientation tests for Liquid test articles with tags
mounted in the nominal configuration for liquid and metallic objects (on foam on plastic bags).
LreTe g a -..3 g Co figuration foreach test's 10-trial
Unstress Parallel Repeat (10)
Stress Parallel Repeat (10)
Unstress Perp Repeat (10)
Stress Perp Repeat (10)-
Random Repeat (10)
#ofTasin CB TiaL r i l2 IdaL3 Idial Trial5 ial6 Trial2 TiaLB Trial Trial1I Mean Std De Av Absolute Error Avg.% Error Ave Read Rate
24 17 14 18 19 15 19 17 19 18 19 1750 1.69 6.50 27.1% 72.9%
24 12 14 8 10 8 13 11 9 10 8 10.30 2.05 13.70 571% 42.9%
24 17 13 20 14 18 17 16 15 18 19 16.70 210 730 30.4% 696%
24 11 13 11 10 13 17 15 13 12 13 1280 1.94 1120 46.7% 53.3%
24 19 15 18 16 17 15 14 15 12 16 15.70 1.90 8.30 34.6% 65.4%
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Liquids (in bags w/ foam)
* Unstress Parallel
100.0% Repeat (10)
80.0% U Parallel
60.0%
40.0% 0 Stress Parallel Repeat
20.0% (10)
0.0% U Unstress Perp Repeat(10)
24
Figure D.5. Shows the average read rates for the tests listed in Table D.7.
Table D.8. Similar to Table D.6, shows results of intensive orientation tests for Metal test articles with tags mounted
in the nominal configuration for liquid and metallic objects (on foam on plastic bags).
Unstress Parallel Repeat (10)
Stress Parallel Repeat (10)
Unstress Perp Repeat (10)
Stress Perp Repeat (10)
Random Repeat (10)
Inf .auin TB I Iai an td DAu.%E ARadbif
24 22 10 17 23 24 21 23 22 19 1 19.17 410 430 179% 821%
24 13 9 11 21 19 18 21 17 19 18 1& iD 395 740 3a8% 69.2%
24 24 19 23 20 24 19 20 230 2 18 2 210 214 3.00 125% 87.5%
24 16 23 117 19 21 17 14 20118 22 18.70 269 5.3) 22 77.9%
24 22 18 123 16 19 15 22119 17 21[19.10 2.51 490 2a4% 79.6%
Metals (in bags w/ foam)
100.0% _m Unstress Parallel
Repeat (10)
80.0% 0 Parallel
60.0% U Stress Parallel Repeat
40.0% (10)
a Unstress Perp Repeat
20.0% (10)
. Perpendicular
0.0%
24
Figure D.6. Shows the average read rates for the tests listed in Table D.8.
Table D.9. Similar to Table D.6, shows results of intensive orientation tests for an Equal Mix of test articles with
tags mounted in the nominal configuration each material type.
Unstress Parallel Repeat (10)
Stress Parallel Repeat (10)
Unstress Perp Repeat (10)
Stress Perp Repeat (10)
Random Repeat (10)
t of Tai In CTB Trial 1II2 DITal Tia L Da l Trial TIia2liia l i ria Ial Mnan Std Ay.nIute hwr  e zr% A
24 22 20 21 22 21 18 22 22 20 22 210 1.26 aim 125% 87.5%
24 21 16 22 19 120 22 23 20 21 22 2 60 191 3.4 142% 85.8%
24 21 20 22 21 19 21 19 20 21 18 21220 117 15.8% 84.2%
24 21 22 20 19 21 19 21 17 21 19 20@ 1.41 4.0 167% 3.3%
24 17 23 23 19 20 21 20 21 19 23 21260 1.92 340 142% 85.8%
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Figure D.7. Shows the average read rates for the tests listed in Table D.9.
ALTERNATIVE REPRESENTATION OF RESULTS FROM EXPERIMENTS 2 & 3
Note: "Tag 1" denotes Alien Squiggle* tags with the specified mounting scheme (foam backing or no foam, as
per the nominal for that material type from Experiment 1), and "Tag 2" denotes Omni-ID ProxTM tags directly
affixed to test articles.
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APPENDIX E: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING INVENTORY MANAGEMENT FOR
HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT AT NASA
SPACE SHUTTLE LOGISTICS AT KENNEDY SPACE CENTER (KSC)
Kennedy Space Center is currently holding hundreds of thousands of spare parts in their
warehouse facilities. They have roughly 110,000 non-flight ground facility line-items in their
inventory database, and some 95,000 flight hardware line-items. According to KSC Shuttle
Logistics engineers, tens of thousands of these parts have not been used in 15 years or more.
However, the vast majority of these items have more than one end-user (the "next-higher-
assembly") - some have hundreds. As long as there remains one such "next-higher-assembly"
still in operation, NASA requires that the item be retained. Also, some 26,000 of the items being
held have National Stock Numbers, which means they can readily be purchased via established
government suppliers; these parts would be good candidates for a Just-In-Time logistics strategy,
but continue to be held in stock by KSC. The result of these two policies is that KSC is currently
running a 50,000-square-foot deficit on warehouse space, during a period in which they are also
trying to find space for new items for Constellation.
Within the main warehouse, KSC has a robotic retrieval system - dubbed Mini-Loads - that
allows efficient storage of smaller parts, those roughly 4 inches or less. This system consists of a
group of six shelves of drawers that are stacked 45 high; upon command, a robotic retriever
picks up the specified drawer and delivers it to the operator, who kits (packs) the item(s) and
enters the transaction into the inventory database. Mini-Loads contains approximately 84,000
(of the 110,000) non-flight ground facility line-items, and roughly 650 (of the 95,000) flight
hardware line-items. Flight hardware is kept in environmentally-controlled sections of the
warehouse, both in Mini-Loads and outside of it.
The Shuttle Logistics organization tracks parts in a database known as PeopleSoft. PeopleSoft
came online in 2002 and is the largest parts database at KSC. Parts typically have a barcode that
is used to reference them in the system, although for smaller items, sometimes the bags or bins
that contain them are barcoded instead. PeopleSoft does not contain entries with item
dimensions - to get an idea of size, an experienced operator can look at the listed warehouse
storage location and infer an approximate item size based on his/her knowledge of the sizes of
different storage spaces. Every year, the logistics group reviews a list of all stocked items that
have had no activity for the last ten years, checking each part for any active "next-higher-
assemblies". If none exist and a part can be excessed, it is added to a "Retention Review"
database which automatically goes out and talks to three other databases, giving potentially
interested parties one last chance to stop its divestment.
Finally, there is a company known as the National Shuttle Logistics Depot (NSLD) that makes
hardware parts that KSC needs but can no longer order from other outside commercial
companies. NSLD is located off-center, in Cape Canaveral.
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BOEING KSC PILOT IN SSPF HIGH BAY
Introduction
In early 2008, KSC's Space Station Processing Facility (SSPF), Boeing CAPPS / Payload
Services brought online a rather impressive RFID asset tracking pilot program. The program
was overseen by Phil Lintereur, the manager of the Boeing CAPPS / Payload Services Fluids and
Propulsion Group, and the vendor was RFID Global Solution. The work was motivated by
several factors, including an incident in which someone accidentally threw away a small piece of
equipment valued at roughly $1 million. Another key factor was an estimate that the system
would render at least two full-time positions unnecessary.
Hardware & System Architecture
The system is built around very small, "2D" active Gen II tags. Some of the tags are the size of a
dime; others are as small as the punch-out from a hole-punch. They broadcast in the 6-8.5 GHz
range, and cost approximately $25 each. The tags are either mounted directly on the objects or
on lanyards that are already attached to objects (for example, tools) for barcodes. Some of the
tags are specially encapsulated to resist impact damage such as might occur if a tool is dropped.
Approximately 1,000 tags are currently involved in Phase I of the pilot; of these, 200 feature
replaceable batteries. The other 800 have permanent batteries and are configured to broadcast
every seven seconds, the longest delay possible with the chosen hardware. Given this setting, the
tags are expected to have a lifetime of 10 years.
The system features a fine-location option; the vendor claims that it can locate a tag within 12
inches of its actual position through the use of triangulation algorithms. The tags are detected
via readers that are hard-mounted throughout the relevant rooms in the facility, and also with
hand-held readers for certain mobile applications such as the equipment vans used to service
payloads at the launch pad. The mounted readers feature a 600-foot read-range, while the hand-
held readers feature a read-range of approximately 10 feet. Also, the system does not seem to be
impacted by modest amounts of metal - for example, it can read through a closed metal cart to
detect the tools stored inside. The vendor's proprietary middleware, GlobalViewTM, powers the
system's data collection and analysis activities.
Current and Future Objectives
Phase I of the project is currently underway. Its objective is to track high-value assets (> $100k)
as well as Multi-Use Mission Support Equipment (MMSE), and also to implement the system in
a set of special vans and a flatbed truck that are used to service payloads at the launch pad.
Additionally, some tags will be used to assist Boeing's Multiflow Schedule Assessment Team
(MSAT), the group that monitors usage of floor space in the SSPF High Bay. This team maps
the floor configuration of the entire high bay once per week; up until now, this has been a
completely manual process. The tags are being used on a trial basis to automatically track the
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movement of all items in a certain portion of the high bay, to determine their usefulness for
facilitating MSAT's mapping work.
Phase II, which will be considered for funding depending on the results of Phase I, would extend
the number and type of assets tracked. It would include the tools and other contents of the SSPF
Instrument Library; a manual inventory of this repository currently requires some 160 person-
hours to complete. Additionally, other Ground Support and Fluids equipment would be tracked,
with things such as serial numbers and calibration information stored on the tags.
Lessons Learned from Approval Process
The Boeing manager reported that the greatest challenge in obtaining approval for the RFID
system was helping reviewers (from Safety / EM / Facilities) understand that the tags'
modulation frequency would not interfere with the Wi-Fi network in the High Bay.
PROJECT CONSTELLATION
CCSDS Wireless Working Group
The Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) is an international working group
which strives to promote interoperability by developing agreed-upon standards for information
systems. NASA, ESA, and CSA are core partners in this effort, but other national space agencies
(such as the Russian Space Agency) are also involved. Historically, these efforts have focused
on interoperability in point-to-point communication/information relay systems such as TDRSS52
and the Deep Space Network, but over the last several years the committee's efforts have
broadened. Of particular note, the Wireless Working Group53 is now focused upon intra-
vehicle/habitat information systems, and it is looking to set standards for inventory management
systems. In this working group, RFID technology has come up with regards to its potential for
inventory tracking, as well as (to a lesser degree) for sensor interrogation.
CEV/Orion & Lunar Habitat
The two main crewed components for Constellation include the CEV 54 and the Lunar Habitat.
Generally speaking, the CEV is the more constrained of the two - mass is an enormous challenge
for that team right now, and current designs indicate that there will be very little margin
available. Furthermore, the volumetric signature of the CEV backplane may not allow that
vehicle to carry CTBs; they simply might not fit. Smaller, individual Ziplocs and other bags will
be used instead, although cargo in general will be very limited aboard CEV. CEV is designed to
be a "taxi", and therefore won't be carrying much cargo in the first place. Also, the transmission
power of some Gen II systems could be a concern due to the vehicle's pyrotechnics. As for the
52 Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
5 JSC is represented on this working group by Patrick Fink and Richard Barton, both of whom were interviewed for
this report.
5 Crew Exploration Vehicle, now officially named "Orion"
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Lunar Habitat, it will clearly contain lots of items that will need to be tracked; however, many
design details remain undefined, as it is still 12 years down the road in terms of its development.
This can be both an opportunity and a challenge for developing any inventory management
architecture.
Other Constellation Work
VerdaSee Solutions Contract
Patrick Fink, Evan Yagoda, and team oversaw a Project Constellation contract with VerdaSee
Solutions, Inc, to take a fresh look at RFID options. In particular, Constellation was interested in
reviewing Gen II tags in light of the significant technological progress that had been made in
recent years. If the hardware can perform, among other characteristics it offers the advantage of
being the industry standard. The contract called for VerdaSee to complete its work by October
of2008.
Extended Range SAW-Based Tag Antenna
In January of 2008, Patrick Fink had some seed funding to develop an "extended range SAW-
based tag antenna". He was partnering with KSC on this work to examine potential test facility
applications; Emilio Valencia was his main point-of-contact at Kennedy.
INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION PROGRAM
RF SAW Station Development Test Objective (SDTO)
History
The RF SAW Station Development Test Objective (SDTO) was a NASA JSC effort, led by Tim
Brown and Amy Schellhase, to run a small demonstration of inventory management on Station
using RF SAW technology. The project was the result of a number of efforts over the last
several years. Initial investigations of RFID indicated that the Gen I technology was not
sufficiently mature for NASA applications. However, a couple of years later, in 2004, NASA
commissioned the University of Nebraska at Lincoln (UNL) to do an RFID market study and
take another look. The recommendation from that study was to build a system around a PDA
that featured a PC-card RFID reader; unfortunately, that particular implementation did not
perform adequately - specifically, the team could not get the tag read-range which they desired.
As Tim explained, for 95% or better read-accuracy, which "has always been our [group's]
requirement," the PDA had to be within a few inches of the target tag, very similar to a barcode.
A year or so after this, Tim heard about RF SAW technology at a conference and subsequently
set up a demonstration with a U. S. vendor, RF SAW Inc. In this demonstration, the company
achieved read-ranges of 30 to 40 feet; Tim and his group were impressed, as this was the first
RFID technology they had seen which ostensibly could address ISS inventory tracking needs.
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Hardware
Tim and Amy decided to move forward with the RF SAW technology and developed a small-
scale demonstration testing aboard the International Space Station. The culmination of this work
was the RF SAW SDTO, which was tested onboard ISS in 200855. The SDTO consisted of a
number of RF SAW-tagged Crew Provision items which were launched on Progress flights 27
and 2856; these were either placed into a few CTBs on-orbit or launched pre-packed in CTB's'
and then read with a custom-built "handheld" reader. The operational scenario for the test was
for a crew member to hold the reader and then spin a CTB (with tagged contents) in front of it, at
a fairly short distance (roughly a couple of feet). Crew Provision items (office supplies, clothing,
etc) were tagged for testing because that organization was very interested in the potential for a
system that could help improve inventory tracking and management. Additionally, since crew
provisions are consumable items, they are replenished on a regular basis thus enabling the
ground to tag the items for the SDTO, rather than having the crew tag items already on ISS.
Tagging of food was considered, however the organization responsible for food was not
enthusiastic about such a use of RFID; they felt that their current tracking system - which is
based on consumption rates - was sufficient. Furthermore, all food is packed in metal food kits
(Figure 4), and reading tags through a metallic container was not practical.
Flight Certification & Export Control
The hardware for the SDTO - particularly the reader - had to go through the typical NASA
certification testing in order to fly. The reader was handed over to JSC's Engineering
organization, which subjected it to "touch", material (outgassing), EMI (Electromagnetic
Interference), and radiation57 testing. Angela Olstead served as the point-of-contact for the
effort. A few minor issues were reported from those tests:
1. The tags initially failed the material tests due to excessive alcohol outgassing; further
investigation revealed that this was a result of the vendor cleaning the tags with
alcohol prior to human-readable label application and tag delivery to NASA. This
was resolved by "baking out" the alcohol from the tags.
2. The radiation testing actually somewhat improved the performance of the tags,
apparently by "cleaning out" some of the etchings.
3. The reader initially failed the EMI test because of an electromagnetic "leak" coming
from where the antenna connector emerged from the aluminum body case. The
vendor provided a solution to this problem and thus resolved the issue.
* Assuming that the reader is delivered without incident by the first flight of ESA's ATV.
56 These flights are referred to as 27P and 28P by NASA.
57 Does it still work after exposure to a heightened radiation environment?
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Additionally, the reader had to clear ITAR / Export Control requirements, but did so without
incident. The tags did not have to be reviewed in this manner because they were categorized as
"labeling", not "hardware".
Challenges
In the process of developing this SDTO, Tim indicated that his team encountered significant
problems with the RF SAW tags. The original plan was to start tagging items on flights 27 and
28P and possibly continue to do so for all future flights, but the team is evaluating the forward
work plan due to hardware problems. Two problems were discovered that did not appear during
testing. First, the tags appeared to be more "brittle" than expected, with several tags breaking at
the antennae during packing operations. Second, the adhesive used to attach the tags to items did
not hold as well as it did during testing. Due to these two problems, it was decided to not
continue tagging operations beyond that needed to support the SDTO until the vendor could
address the issues. Furthermore, the reader itself was larger than what was desired for an
operational system. NASA had asked the vendor to use as the reader's power source a
camcorder battery58 that was already approved for flight; originally, the vendor believed that they
would need to use three such batteries in order to achieve three hours of lifetime for the reader,
and so sized the reader box accordingly, which made it quite large. The vendor later discovered
that they could make do with only one battery, but the shell for the box had already been built
and apparently it was not feasible to resize it given time and/or budget constraints. While the
reader size does not preclude its future use, the team planned to address the reader size after
completing the SDTO to determine whether it is cost effective to pursue a smaller reader.
Ideas for other Use Cases for RAMSES and/or other RFID Technology
Trash
A number of NASA employees who were interviewed for this effort independently suggested
that an RFID inventory management system could be useful to track trash. One NASA
Engineer, who works waste-disposal issues for JSC MOD, suggested two possible benefits that
could be realized by tagging items and installing readers at the airlock hatches where the Shuttle,
Soyuz, Progress, and (soon) ATV and HTV dock. The idea is that such readers could track and
verify the movement of tagged objects as they are placed into a vehicle for return or disposal.
One clear benefit of such a system would be to prevent the accidental disposal of items; for
example, it is not unheard of for small items such as memory cards to be lost in such a manner.
Of equal or greater importance, however, would be the system's potential to eliminate the
"double-counting" problem that currently exists. As mentioned in an earlier section, it is
58 Lithium-Ion, Canon Battery Pack BP-930 (alt. -927), NASA part # SED33111486-303;
http://estore.usa.canon.com/images/accessories/DV DVD Camcorders/Batteries/D85-0962-201 ,.jpg; See
Appendix C for NASA engineering drawing.
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sometimes unclear how much trash is actually loaded into the vehicle. For example, say that the
crew reports to Mission Control that they have loaded four Rubber-Lined bags of Common trash
into the Progress. Common trash does not require pre-approval prior to being placed in a waste
receptacle, so the ground does not know the specific contents of these bags (just that it generally
contains "Common trash" - tissues, food scraps, used office supplies, clothing, etc). At the same
time, IMS lists several pieces of used clothing as "trash," and automatically assumes that they
have been transferred into the Progress. The problem is that, unless the crew specifically tells
the ground how they have disposed of the clothing, it is unclear whether the clothing was loaded
into the vehicle inside the four Rubber-Lined bags, or in addition to them. This "double-
counting" introduces uncertainty into both the mass properties of the vehicle 59 as well as the
post-disposal bill that Russia generates and sends to NASA. Brian estimates that he spends five
to ten hours per flight on post-flight billing reconciliation, trying to determine exactly how much
trash was loaded and thus how much the US bill should actually be.
There is certainly interest within NASA in this application; however, it seems to present a
significant challenge in that it would be very difficult to tag every individual item. For example,
under the current system a package of five new t-shirts contains one barcode on the package
itself. The individual t-shirts are not barcoded. Therefore, as the application of passive RFID
tags would likely mirror that of barcodes, unless the shirts are put back into their original (or an
equivalent) package for disposal, they would not be tagged and a hatch reader would still be
unable to detect their movement.
Middeck Lockers
According to another NASA Engineer, a member of NASA KSC's Space Station / Payloads
Processing Mechanical Engineering Group, the shuttle middeck lockers could be a very useful
application for a RAMSES-type system. Astronauts on-orbit are supposed to pack these lockers
according to specific instructions and lists that Mission Control sends up, but the crew often
deviates - they try to cram as much as possible into the lockers (which will be returning to Earth,
rather than being disposed of), they put items into the wrong lockers, etc. The result is that it is
very difficult for Mattingly's group to sort things out post-flight and return items to their proper
owners.
The most obvious downside of this application is that the Shuttle Program is scheduled to end in
2010, and therefore would not have any significant opportunity to see a return on such an
investment.
Crew Health and Experiments (CHEX)
This JSC group deals with many biological-related items such as drugs, medical samples, and
life science experiments. They expressed interest in two potential applications for RAMSES.
First, they are interested in tracking their items through terrestrial shipping and launch
59A potentially significant concern for ESA's ATV, based on reports that it has very little fuel margin.
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preparation, especially if they could fuse the inventory information with geographic location and
environmental conditions. Secondly, they would like to be able to track small items on ISS such
as cotton balls, pills, etc., in order to better understand consumption rates (both overall and for
specific crew members) and thus improve their resupply planning and crew health profiles.
The first application seems potentially feasible given the current development direction of
RAMSES; such a system could replace the use of HOBOs to monitor environmentally-sensitive
shipments. The second idea is much more challenging, as these are items that cannot really be
tagged at this time. Perhaps steps could be made in that direction, though - for instance, one
could install some kind of "smart medical 'cabinet"' on ISS which requires the crew to gain
access using an RFID badge and also record which medicine bottle (an object that could be
tagged) they remove; thus, the system could associate a crew member with a certain supply, even
if the actual count of items consumed could not be determined. Of course, there might also be
privacy concerns with such a system.
Module / Vehicle Hatches
Several NASA Engineers suggested mounting RFID readers at all vehicle and ISS module
hatches, similar to the trash-tracking concept but with other purposes. In particular, one thought
that this strategy might be very beneficial for CEV, in order to track the flow of items to and
from the Lunar Lander. Due to the mass constraints on CEV, a large amount of CEV cargo will
need to be launched in the lander and then transferred to CEV once the two vehicles dock on-
orbit; it will be essential to make sure that all this cargo gets where it needs to go.
A KSC Engineer suggested a different use for the same system; he thought that it could be useful
to prevent Foreign Object Debris (FOD) from tools or other ground support equipment that gets
accidentally left inside the a vehicle (shuttle, CEV, or the Lunar Lander) after maintenance
operations. The system would register an alert if all of the tools that it tracked entering the
vehicle were not also detected exiting it.
Both of these concepts hold some potential; some have raised objections to the second, noting
that it would not address FOD from other (non-taggable) sources such as eyeglasses, but this
does not alter the fact that it could help to mitigate as least some sources of FOD. Furthermore,
if the tools are already tagged - as is happening with Boeing's SSPF RFID pilot program - the
only additional (albeit nontrivial) task would be to mount a few readers on the vehicles
themselves.
Tracking/ Auditing Ground Assets
Another suggestion was that an RFID system could be used to facilitate the tracking and auditing
of NASA's terrestrial assets, ranging from tools and expensive servicing equipment to office
computers and TVs. A NASA manager explained that this could significantly reduce the effort
required to conduct these audits, which are mandatory for the entire center at least once per year.
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The Boeing SSPF pilot is moving somewhat in this direction, but at a much smaller scale than
envisioned by this manager. Clearly, the major obstacle to a wider implementation would be the
enormous capital cost that would be required.
Tracking People in Hazardous Locations
Finally, it was also suggested that RFID could be used to track employees in hazardous
locations, such as the high bays or the launch pad. Currently, KSC uses a system in which an
employee must leave a copy of his or her picture badge on a board outside the hazardous
location; in the event of an emergency, this badge board serves as the reference for who is inside
the hazardous area. Also, an employee must swipe his/her badge through a card reader in order
to gain ingress or egress from the area, an action which allows the creation of an electronic
reference list. If some kind of RFID system (probably using active tags similar to those in
Boeing's SSPF pilot) could track more precisely the location of all employees within a hazardous
area, this could be a useful aid for rescue workers in the event of an emergency. However, such
600
a concept would have nontrivial privacy implications as well as technical challenges**
60 For example, on the launch pad there would be a great deal of metallic interference, and also potential concerns
about the transmission power due to pyrotechnics on the vehicle.
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APPENDIX F: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE RAMSES CTB PROTOTYPE
Table F.1 Parts List for RAMSES Prototype Modification Kit
Item # Qty Item Part Number Manufacturer
1 1 Directed 8601 Magnetic Switch Radio Shack
2 2 BP6-915 RCP Right hand circular antennas Mobile Mark
3 2 BP6-915 LCP Left hand circular antennas Mobile Mark
4 1 Slimcab Desktop Cabinet CS-11221-s RS Electronics
5 1 Skyetek M9 Reader SM-M9-MH-UF-V30 Skyetek, Inc.
6 1 Skyetek Interface Board SP-IB-CB-00 Skyetek, Inc.
7 1 SkyePlus MXU 860-960 MHz antenna multiplexer (4 port) SP-MX-04-UF-M9 Skyetek, Inc.
8 1 Verdex-Pro XM4-bt XM4-bt Gumstix, Inc.
9 1 ConsoleLCD-vx ConsoleLCD-vx Gumstix, Inc.
10 1 Netpro-vx Netpro-vx Gumstix, Inc.
11 1 WiFi Module FCC for Netpro-vx Gumstix, Inc.
12 1 Screws & Spacers Kit Gumstix, Inc.
13 1 Power Module, RAMSES Power Switch (Custom Made) Aurora Flight Sciences
14 1 Conn ADT SMA Jack/MMCX Plug ACX1352-ND Digikey
15 6 SMA Bulkhead Connectors Jack to Jack ($14.12each) 530-142-0901-401 Mouser Electronics
16 1 LED (Front Panel)
17 1 Power Switch (2-position)
18 3 SMA Cable Assemblies STRT Plugs 316 6" ($12.08 Each) 530-415-0029-006 Mouser Electronics
19 2 SMA Cable Assemblies STRT Plugs 316 12" ($11.00 Each) 530-415-0029-012 Mouser Electronics
20 1 Mini USB V2.0 Cable: TypeB Male to Mini 5 pin Male 70-8033 Willy's Electronics
21 1 USB Battery Cable (5V Pocket-Size Lithium Battery Pack) BIXComputers
22 10 Aluminum Spacer Male-Female 1/4" length 2-56Screw ($0.36 each) 93505A211 McMaster-Carr
23 10 Aluminum Spacer Male-Female 1/2" length 2-56 Screw ($0.36 each) 93505A213 McMaster-Carr
24 10 Aluminum Spacer Male-Female 3/4" length 2-56 Screw ($0.39 each) 93505A215 McMaster-Carr
25 1 18-8SS PanHead Phillips Machine Screw 0-80 thread 1" length. Pack of 50 91772A102 McMaster-Carr
26 1 Brass Miniature Machine Screw Nut Thread Size 0-80. Pack of 25. McMaster-Carr
27 1 Pan Head Phillips Machine Screw 2-56Thread 1" length. Pack of 100. McMaster-Carr
28 1 zinc-plated Steel Machine Screw Hex Nut 2-56Thread Size. 3/16" Width. 1/16" Height McMaster-Carr
29 1 Zinc-plated Steel Pan Head Phillips Machine Screw 2-56Thread, 3/16" Length. Pack of 100. McMaster-Carr
30 3.5 mA2 Copper Wire Mesh (16 Mesh Copper .011" Wire Dia.) 016X016C0110W48T TWP, Inc.
31 3.5 mA2 Foam spacing material (1.25" thick) I
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